CASE NO. 91-CRD-2-81Workers’ Compensation Commission
NOVEMBER 17, 1982
The Claimant-Appellee was represented by David J. Morrissey, Esq.
The Respondent-Appellant was represented by Robert G. Girard, Esq., Assistant Attorney General.
This Petition for Review from the October 5, 1981 Decision of the Commissioner for the Second District, was argued October 29, 1982 before a Compensation Review Division Panel consisting of Commissioners John Arcudi, Rhoda Loeb and Frank Verrilli.
John Arcudi, Chairman John Arcudi, Chairman
Rhoda Loeb, Commissioner Rhoda Loeb, Commissioner
Frank Verrilli, Commissioner Frank Verrilli, Commissioner
FINDING AND AWARD
The Finding and Award of the Commissioner is affirmed and adopted as the Finding and Award of the Compensation Review Division.
OPINION
Legal rather than factual issues constitute the principal basis of this appeal. The relevant facts are mainly undisputed. Claimant-Appellee has been a member of the Connecticut State Police since 1967. In 1969 his assignment became Resident State Policeman in the Town of Old Lyme pursuant to Sec. 29-5, C.G.S.[1]
As such Resident State Policeman his usual work week was forty (40) hours during which time he performed police duties such as answering calls, investigating accidents and crimes, patrolling, and supervising and training constables.
In addition to his regular police duties, claimant’s job required him to answer calls after hours at home. As required by State Police Regulations, claimant enforced local ordinances and provided a liaison between the First Selectman of Old Lyme and the Westbrook State Police Barracks.[2] Beyond the duties specified in the State Police Regulations and the Agreement between the State and Town, claimant was expected to and did participate in many civic and police activities performed after working hours and considered to be an integral part of his job as testified to by the Westbrook Troop Commanders, Lieutenant William N. Smith and former State Police Commissioner Edward P. Leonard.
As part of this extra duty service not specified in the Regulations, claimant in 1977 advised the Old Lyme First Selectman and other town officials that there was need for a police patrol boat because of the Town’s extensive waterfront. There were no budgeted funds for such an acquisition, but claimant succeeded in obtaining funding for the boat from a private anonymous source. The acquisition of the boat and its funding became an issue in the November, 1977 municipal election campaign. During that election the opponents of First Selectman Maurice McCarthy charged that the boat had been purchased by some secret police fund. Selectman McCarthy was defeated.
Claimant felt his own honesty and integrity had been impugned by the charge, but his job did not permit him to answer the charge as it was an involvement in a political election. On January 28, 1978 a post-election testimonial party was held at a local restaurant for the defeated First Selectman McCarthy. Claimant considered it necessary to attend this function as part of his liaison duties with town officials. Both Lieutenant William N. Smith and State Police Commissioner Edward P. Leonard concurred that attendance at such a function, although not absolutely required, would reasonably be expected of a Resident State Police Officer under the circumstances.
In fact during claimant’s presence at the testimonial the question of the police patrol boat and its funding entered into the conversation. On overhearing remarks pertaining to that issue, claimant defended his own actions and those of the former First Selectman. The conversation became heated, and the resulting stressful situation caused claimant to suffer a myocardial infarction and subsequent disability and expense for medical treatment which have become the subject of this proceeding.
Respondent-Appellant originally questioned the causation of the heart attack, i.e. whether or not it was caused by the stress suffered at the January 22, 1978 affair, but it seems to have abandoned that attack on this appeal, and at any rate, there was sufficient evidence from the medical experts offered by the claimant to justify the Second District Commissioner’s Finding in this regard. The parties apparently not rely on the rebuttable presumption afforded by Sec. 29-4a, C.G.S.[3]
The substance of Respondent’s appeal lies in its denial that a “political cocktail party” can be an event arising out of and in the course of employment. Cases cited for this position are Williams vs. State of Connecticut, 152 Conn. 692 (1965), injury to a state employee while proceeding to a union sponsored picnic, Mulligan vs. Oakes, 128 Conn. 488 (1942) injury on employee’s day off in automobile lent by employer and McNamara vs. Hamden, 176 Conn. 547 (1979), off duty injury on employer premises while playing ping pong.
Appellant’s brief cites McNamara only to distinguish it from the instant case, attempting to show thereby that in McNamara the injury was compensable because it occurred on the employer’s premises while here the injury took place outside regular duty hours, as in McNamara, but off the employer premises. Such a distinction does not seem a relevant tool of analysis when applied to this case. McNamara held that when an injury occurred on the premises, it was not necessary to satisfy the employer benefit test as in Williams, supra and Smith vs. Seamless Rubber, 111 Conn. 365 (1930). Moreover, the basic McNamara holding began with delineating what is incidental to the employment, and that is really the question in the instant case. “Was attendance at the January 22, 1978 reception incidental to the employment?” If it was, an injury precipitated by such attendance is one arising out of and in the course of employment. If not, the injury was not compensable.
The facts found by the Commissioner led him to the conclusion that such activity was an incident of the employment. The testimony of State Police Commissioner Leonard and Lieutenant Smith agreed that it was such an incident even if not specifically ordered or required. There was no evidence offered to contradict this assertion. That being the case, we must affirm the decision of the Commissioner.