CASE NO. 430 CRD-3-85Workers’ Compensation Commission
MARCH 23, 1988
The claimant was represented by James Giulietti, Esq., of Parrett, Porto, Parese, Colwell and Giulietti.
The respondents were represented by Michael O’Sullivan, Esq., and Lucas Strunk, Esq., both of Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick.
This Petition for Review from the November 12, 1985 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Third District was heard October 30, 1987 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Michael S. Sherman.
FINDING AND AWARD
The Third District Finding and Award of November 12, 1985 is hereby affirmed and adopted as the Finding and Award of this Division.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, Chairman.
This matter again comes before us virtue of the Appellate Court’s decision, Sager v. GAB Business Services, Inc., 11 Conn. App. 693
(1987), in which it set aside the Compensation Review Division’s April 9, 1986 Dismissal of Appeal on procedural grounds and remanded for further proceedings on the substantive issues involved.
On March 23, 1984 Claimant suffered a myocardial infarction which he alleges was caused by job-related stress and was therefore compensable. The Third District November 12, 1985 Finding and Award so found and awarded chapter 568 benefits.
Respondents’ appeal denies that Claimant’s myocardial infarction arose out of and in the course of employment[1] . They argue that the evidence below was not sufficient to establish the causal nexus between the injury and employment. We disagree.
McDonough v. Connecticut Bank Trust, 204 Conn. 104
(1987); Mahoney v. Beatman, 110 Conn. 184 (1929) are controlling. Dr. Harley Meia’s testimony below indicated on the job stress was “an important factor” which resulted in Claimant’s heart attack. Employer’s carrier holds that an “important” factor is not the legal equivalent of a “substantial” factor. Black’s Law Dictionary defines substantial as “of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable. Belonging to substance; actually existing; real; not seeming or imaginary; not illusive; solid; true; veritable. . . .”, Black’s Law Dictionary 1280 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). We conclude “important” to be the legal equivalent of “substantial” in a proximate cause analysis.
Therefore, we affirm the November 12, 1985 Finding and Award.
Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Michael S. Sherman concur.