CASE NO. 994 CRD-2-90-3Workers’ Compensation Commission
SEPTEMBER 12, 1991
The claimant was represented by David Neusner, Esq. and Thomas Albin, Esq. both of Embry and Neusner.
The respondent was represented by Rose McBride, Esq. and Linda J. Larson Adamson, Esq., both of General Dynamics Electric Boat Division. Also appearing at oral argument was John Greiner, Esq., Murphy Beane.
This Petition for Review from the March 12, 1990 Finding and Award of the Commissioner for the Second District was heard February 22, 1991 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald Doyle.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.
Central to this appeal are Sec. 31-284b[1] medical fringe benefit entitlements. The respondent argues that claimant was not receiving Connecticut Workers’ Compensation payments for his August 12, 1983 injury but was being paid instead under The U.S. Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C.A. 901 et seq. Therefore it contends the Second District was wrong to award Sec. 31-284b benefits.
Section 31-284b requires that an employer maintain an employee’s group health insurance as long as “the employee is eligible to receive or is receiving workers’ compensation payments pursuant to this chapter.” The respondent maintains that before the commissioner could order continuation of these fringe benefits, he had to find eligibility for chapter 568 benefits after an evidentiary hearing on that specific point and that eligibility for U.S. Longshore benefits is not the necessary equivalent to Connecticut chapter 568 eligibility. The commissioner’s Finding and Award, paragraph #7, found “claimant is receiving compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act for repetitive trauma injuries which occurred between 1978 and August, 1983 and that the date of said injury is prior to August 12, 1983. It is further found that claimant is therefore eligible to receive Workers’ Compensation payments pursuant to Chapter 568 . . . .”
That finding seems to equate Connecticut chapter 568 eligibility with eligibility under the Longshore Act. But the two laws are enactments by different governmental entities with separate and distinct systems of administration. The commissioner’s ruling contains no specific findings that claimant was eligible under the Connecticut Act other than the language quoted above. A finding simply that claimant was receiving Longshore payments is not sufficient to support the conclusions of Connecticut eligibility. See Cormican v. McMahon, 102 Conn. 234 (1925). See also, Griffin v. General Dynamics, 868 CRD-2-89-5 (decided Sept. 27, 1990).
Since we so find, it is not necessary to consider respondent’s other arguments. However some comment on them may be useful in future proceedings below. The trier did conduct an evidentiary hearing as to claimant’s eligibility for chapter 568 benefits. The January 19, 1988 Formal Hearing Transcript and the accompanying exhibits certainly indicate that such a hearing to determine Connecticut eligibility was held. See e.g., Transcript of January 19, 1988 Formal Hearing at 24-25. Further, the colloquy between the commissioner and respondent’s counsel emphasizes commissioner’s concern that counsel understand the hearing provided respondent with an opportunity to proffer evidence to refute the claimant’s assertion of eligibility under chapter 568.
We sustain the appeal and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Commissioners Frank Verrilli and Donald Doyle concur.