STATE v. BUNKER, 280 Conn. 512 (2006)

909 A.2d 946

No. (SC 17491).Supreme Court of Connecticut

Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Argued October 27, 2006.

Officially released November 21, 2006.

Procedural History
Two part substitute information charging the defendant, in the first part, with the crimes of sale of narcotics and possession of narcotics, and, in the second part, with previously having been convicted of the crimes of sale of narcotics and possession of narcotics, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, geographical area number twelve, where the court, Swords, J., denied the defendant’s motions to disqualify the judicial authority and to identify an informant; thereafter, the first part of the information was tried to the jury before Swords, J.; verdict of guilty; subsequently, the defendant was presented to the court, Swords, J., on a plea of nolo contendere to the second part of the information; judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Schaller, Flynn and DiPentima, Js., which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court Appeal dismissed.

Kirstin B. Coffin, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Adam B. Scott, supervisory assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion
PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Michael Bunker, appeals, following our grant of his petition for certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming

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his conviction of sale of narcotics in violation of General Statutes §21a-277 (a) and possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes § 21a-279 (a).[1] State v. Bunker, 89 Conn. App. 605, 635, 874 A.2d 301 (2005). On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court improperly: (1) denied his motion for recusal of the judicial authority; (2) denied his motion to identify a confidential informant, a disclosure that was essential to his defense of entrapment; and (3) permitted the state to introduce evidence of other misconduct, specifically a subsequent drug sale. Id., 607. The Appellate Court rejected these claims in a comprehensive opinion. Id., 622, 628, 635. We subsequently granted the defendant’s petition for certification limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in not recusing herself pursuant to Practice Book §§ 1-22 (a) and 1-23, and canon 3 (c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct?” State v. Bunker, 275 Conn. 903, 882 A.2d 677
(2005).

On appeal to this court, the defendant claims that the trial judge should have recused herself pursuant to canon 3 (c) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, [2] because

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her impartiality reasonably could be questioned in connection with her former employment as the state’s attorney for the judicial district of Tolland. Specifically, the defendant relies on: (1) the trial judge’s supervisory role over the prosecutions that had led to his multiple prior convictions for the possession and sale of narcotics, which formed the basis of the second part of this information that enhanced his sentence in this case; see footnote 1 of this opinion; and (2) the trial judge’s representation of the state at a 1992 proceeding to modify his probation arising from convictions unrelated to this case.

After examining the entire record on appeal and considering the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we have determined that the appeal in this case should be dismissed on the ground that certification was improvidently granted.

The appeal is dismissed.