STATE v. CAMPBELL, 180 Conn. 557 (1980)

429 A.2d 960

Supreme Court of Connecticut

COTTER, C.J., LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, PETERS and DALY, Js.

Convicted of the crime of assault on a person sixty years of age or older (53a-61a) and sentenced to a one-year term of imprisonment, the defendant appealed to the Appellate Session of the Superior Court. He claimed that the trial court erred in concluding that a minimum nonsuspendible prison sentence of one year was mandated by statute (53a-36) for a conviction under 53a-61a. From the judgment of the Appellate Session determining that the trial court had the option of releasing the defendant unconditionally, of fining him or of imposing a one-year prison sentence, the state, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Held that since the legislature, in enacting 53a-36, clearly expressed its intent to punish one convicted of assault on an elderly person more severely than one convicted of assault on a person under sixty years of age, the Appellate Session erred in concluding that the trial court had any alternative but to impose the sentence it did.

Argued March 4, 1980 —

Decision released May 13, 1980

Information charging the defendant with the crime of assault on a person sixty years of age or older, brought to the Court of Common Pleas in the sixteenth geographical area, where the defendant pleaded nolo contendere before the court, Graham, J., which, after finding the defendant guilty, imposed a sentence of imprisonment of one year; the defendant

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appealed that sentence to the Appellate Session of the Superior Court, A. Healey, Parskey and D. Shea, Js., which vacated that sentence and remanded the case with direction that the defendant be resentenced, from which the state, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Error; judgment directed.

Robert E. Beach, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

Martin Epstein, assistant public defender, for the appellee (defendant).

BOGDANSKI, J.

Upon entering a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of assault of a victim sixty years of age or older in violation of Public Acts 1977, No. 77-422 4 (now General Statutes 53a-61a), the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year. In imposing the sentence the trial court concluded that the legislature had mandated a minimum nonsuspendible sentence of one year for the crime charged. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Session of the Superior Court which reversed the trial court, concluding that No. 77-422 of the 1977 Public Acts did not preclude the imposition of a penalty other than a term of imprisonment of one year. Upon the granting of the state’s petition for certification, this appeal followed.

The crime for which the defendant stands convicted is punishable as a class A misdemeanor. General Statutes 53a-61a.[1] Section 6 of Public Acts

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1977, No. 77-422 amended 53a-36[2] to provide that when a person is found guilty under 53a-61a
“the minimum term shall be not less than one year and such sentence shall not be suspended or reduced.”

Section 53a-28[3] of the General Statutes, the general penalty section, outlines eight sentencing options available for violations of the Penal Code (title 53a). Six of these options involve the imposition of a term of imprisonment. Of the remaining two options, one involves a fine and the other an

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unconditional discharge. In certain cases, such as those involving violations of the drug laws under chapter 359 or convictions of class A felonies such as murder or kidnapping, other statutory sentencing provisions apply. In all other cases, the sentencing options of 53a-28 apply unless restricted by some other statutory provision.

The issue on this appeal[4] is whether the trial court, in sentencing a defendant convicted of assault of a person sixty or older, has the option of imposing either a fine or a sentence of unconditional discharge, or a one year mandatory nonsuspendible term of imprisonment.[5]

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The Appellate Session of the Superior Court, disagreeing with the trial court, ruled that it is only when the court decides to impose a sentence of imprisonment that it is bound by the legislative mandate in 53a-36; otherwise the trial court has the option of imposing a sentence of unconditional discharge or a fine as provided in 53a-28. According to the Appellate Session, the trial court had the option of releasing the defendant, with no conditions attached to that release,[6] imposing a fine in an amount not to exceed $1000,[7] or imposing a nonsuspendible term of imprisonment of one year. The Appellate Court’s ruling was implicitly based on its conclusion that no ambiguity in the statutory scheme resulted from enactment of Public Acts 1977, No. 77-422 and that therefore it was not necessary to determine legislative intent. We disagree.

It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that statutes are to be construed so that they carry out the intent of the legislature. Bell v. Planning Zoning Commission, 173 Conn. 223, 227, 377 A.2d 299 (1977); Sillman v. Sillman, 168 Conn. 144,

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147, 358 A.2d 150 (1975); Whitfield v. Empire Mutual Ins. Co., 167 Conn. 499, 506, 356 A.2d 139 (1975). In determining the true meaning of a statute when there is genuine uncertainty as to how it should apply, identifying the problem in society to which the legislature addressed itself by examining the legislative history of the statute under litigation is helpful. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) 45.02; Lee v. Lee, 145 Conn. 355, 143 A.2d 154 (1958).

It is indisputable that the problem which the legislature addressed was violent crimes against those most vulnerable and least able to resist. Representative Robert G. Gilligan in speaking in favor of the bill outlined the reasons for distinguishing between persons sixty and over and those younger. “In the first place, older persons are more likely to live alone and travel alone and that isolation tends to increase their vulnerability to crime. Further, older persons have diminished physical strength and stamina and, therefore, are less able to defend themselves or to escape from threatening situations. Three, older persons are more likely to suffer from physical ailments such as loss of hearing or sight or arthritis which makes them more vulnerable. Four, older persons are more easily injured since their bones are more brittle and slower to recover from their injuries. Five, older persons are more likely to be dependent upon walking or public transportation and, therefore, are more exposed to assault. Six, the dates of receipt of monthly pension and benefit checks are widely known increasing the likelihood that older persons will be carrying cash and the likelihood of assault at regular intervals.” 20 H.R. Proc., Pt. 7, 1977 Sess., pp. 2896-97. The

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legislature clearly felt that the imposition of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment would have a deterrent effect on the commission of such crimes.[8]

Moreover, the law favors rational and sensible statutory construction. Sutherland, supra, 45.12. The unreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571, 14 L.Ed.2d 75, 85 S.Ct. 1162 (1965); Citerella v. United Illuminating Co., 158 Conn. 600, 609, 266 A.2d 382 (1969); see also Stanley v. Justice Court for Auburn Judicial District of Placer County, 55 Cal.App.3d 244, 127 Cal.Rptr. 532 (1976); McAdams v. Barbieri, 143 Conn. 405, 123 A.2d 182
(1956); Bergner v. State, 144 Conn. 282, 130 A.2d 293 (1957). When the literal meaning of an act is ambiguous, the construction which will accord reasonable meaning rather than an absurd one is preferred. “When two constructions are possible, courts will adopt the one which makes the statute effective and workable, and not one which leads to difficult and possibly bizarre results”

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Muller v. Town Plan Zoning Commission, 145 Conn. 325, 331, 142 A.2d 524 (1958); Milano v. Warden, 166 Conn. 178, 187, 348 A.2d 590 (1974). Thus courts are warranted in assuming a reasonable and rational result was intended by the legislature. Norwich Land Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 170 Conn. 1, 4, 363 A.2d 1386 (1975).

By providing for a mandatory one year term of imprisonment, which term may not be suspended or reduced, for the crime of assault in the third degree where the victim is sixty or over the legislature clearly expressed its intent to punish one convicted of that crime more severely than one convicted of assault in the third degree where the victim is under sixty. To conclude that the legislature intended that the sentencing court would have the discretion to sentence one convicted of assault on an elderly person to an unconditional discharge — the most lenient sentence possible — or to an unsuspendible one year term of imprisonment — the most severe sentence possible — would be to thwart the legislature’s purpose of punishing more severely those convicted of crimes against a class of victims in especial need of protection.

We therefore hold that one convicted of third degree assault of a person sixty or over must be sentenced to a one year term of imprisonment as provided for in 53a-36 of the General Statutes.

There is error, the judgment of the Appellate Session of the Superior Court is set aside and the case remanded with direction to render judgment in accordance with the decision of the trial court.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

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