578 A.2d 664
(8075)Appellate Court of Connecticut
O’CONNELL, NORCOTT and LANDAU, Js.
Convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crimes of possession of narcotics, sale of narcotics and hindering prosecution, the defendant appealed to this court claiming, inter alia, that the trial court should have granted his motion for an evaluation before committing him to the custody of the commissioner of correction after he was returned from a drug treatment center as unfit for treatment. Held: 1. The defendant’s claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that he had not been properly advised of the consequences of his guilty plea to the charge of possession of narcotics with intent to sell and that he should be permitted to withdraw that plea was not supported by the record and was not reviewable. 2. The trial court should not have determined that it did not have the authority to modify the defendant’s sentence which was in excess of three years; where a defendant is committed to the custody of the executive director of the state alcohol and drug abuse commission for treatment pursuant to the drug dependency statutes (21a-285 and 19a-387), and is subsequently found unfit for such treatment, the defendant must, by statute (19a-388 [c]), be returned to the court for such further proceedings as the court may deem appropriate.
Argued May 7, 1990
Decision released August 14, 1990
Information, in the first case, charging the defendant with the crimes of interfering with an officer and hindering prosecution in the first degree, and information, in the second case, charging the defendant with the crime of possession of narcotics, and substitute information, in the third case, charging the defendant with the crime of sale of narcotics, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the cases were consolidated and presented to the court, Lavery, J., on a plea of guilty of the crimes of hindering prosecution in the first degree, possession of narcotics and sale of narcotics; judgment of guilty of those crimes, from which the defendant appealed to this court. Revised in part; judgment directed in part; further proceedings.
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Barbara Sorrentino, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Rita M. Shair, deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom were John Connelly, state’s attorney, and, on the brief, Marcia Smith and Karen Diebolt, assistant state’s attorneys, for the appellee (state).
LANDAU, J.
The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction following his guilty plea to sale of narcotics in violation of General Statutes 21a-277
(a), possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes 21a-279 (a), and hindering prosecution in the first degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-166. The defendant claims that the trial court (1) failed to advise him of the consequences of his guilty plea, (2) should not have accepted his Alford plea to hindering prosecution as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary where the state’s asserted factual basis was inadequate to support such a plea,[1] and (3) improperly determined that it did not have the authority to modify his sentence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On April 10, 1989, the defendant entered his pleas pursuant to a plea agreement between him and the state. As agreed, the court imposed a total effective sentence of eight years, and stayed execution of the sentence under the drug dependency statutes, General Statutes 19a-387 (a) and 21a-285 (a).[2] The court
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committed the defendant to the Connecticut Alcohol and Drug Abuse Commission (CADAC) for drug treatment at the Berkshire Woods Treatment Center plus five years probation. Four days later, the defendant was found unfit for treatment at that facility and was brought back before the court.
Upon his return to the court, the defendant sought an evaluation by the Whiting Forensic Institute pursuant to General Statutes 17-244. The court, determining that the defendant violated the stay agreement by being brought back before the court, lifted the stay and denied his motion for evaluation. The court concluded that because the defendant was a sentenced prisoner, it no longer had the power to modify his sentence. The court then committed the defendant to the custody of the commissioner of correction in accordance with the original sentence.
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I
Initially, the defendant requests this court to vacate his sentence and permit withdrawal of his guilty pleas contending that they were not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily because he was not advised of the consequences of his plea in violation of due process. Because this claim was not preserved in the trial court, it is reviewable only if it meets the requirements set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989). The defendant’s claim is not supported by the record and thus fails to meet the first requirement.
Before he can enter a valid guilty plea, a defendant must be fully aware of the direct consequences of his plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Sherbo v. Manson, 21 Conn. App. 172, 181, 572 A.2d 378 (1990). To ensure compliance with this constitutional mandate, Practice Book 711 requires that the trial court address the defendant personally and determine that he fully understands the nature of the charge against him. The court must also advise him of (1) the mandatory minimum sentence, (2) the maximum possible sentence, and (3) the fact that he has the right to plead not guilty, the right to be tried by jury, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right against self-incrimination. The court must also ensure that the plea is voluntary and is not the result of force or threats. Practice Book 712.
The scope of “direct consequences” is narrow and is limited to those consequences enumerated in Practice Book 711. State v. Gilnite, 202 Conn. 369, 383, 521 A.2d 547 (1987); Sherbo v. Manson, supra. There is no requirement that the defendant be advised of every possible consequence of such a plea. State v.
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Gilnite, supra; Sherbo v. Hanson, supra. A review of the record clearly indicates that the trial court followed the procedures set forth in Practice Book 711 and 712.
II
The defendant’s final claim is that the trial court has the power to modify a sentence rendered pursuant to General Statutes 19a-388 (c).[3] We agree.
A trial court ordinarily does not have the power to modify a criminal sentence in excess of three years. State v. Lombardo, 19 Conn. App. 631, 636, 563 A.2d 1030 (1989); see also State v. Hanson, 210 Conn. 519, 556 A.2d 1007 (1989). Where, however, a defendant is committed for treatment pursuant to the drug dependency statutes, and is subsequently found unfit for treatment, he must under General Statutes 19a-388 (c) be returned to the court “for such further proceedings as the court may deem appropriate.” (Emphasis added.) Under this provision, the court can conduct further proceedings to reassess the defendant’s sentencing alternatives.[4] Moreover, the drug dependency statutes do not preclude a court from allowing further examination of an individual after sentencing. General Statutes 19a-388 (c). Although the court may deny such a request; see State v. Gates, 198 Conn. 397, 405, 503 A.2d 163 (1986); it has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for reevaluation.
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The judgment of conviction of hindering prosecution in the first degree in violation of General Statutes 53a-166
is vacated and the case remanded with direction to dismiss that count. The sentences imposed for sale of narcotics in violation of General Statutes 21a-277 (a) and possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes 21a-279 (a) are vacated, and the case is remanded for resentencing on those counts in accordance with this opinion.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.