562 A.2d 1156
(7542)Appellate Court of Connecticut
SPALLONE, O’CONNELL and NORCOTT, Js.
The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court declaring his automobile to be a nuisance and ordering it forfeited pursuant to the statute 54-33g) authorizing the disposal of property involved in criminal activities. The automobile had been searched pursuant to a warrant
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authorizing a search of the vehicle and of the defendant’s two sons, and five and one-half grams of cocaine had been found in the glove compartment. Held that contrary to the claims of the defendant, whether he had knowledge of his sons’ illegal use of the vehicle was irrelevant, and no explicit finding by the trial court on that issue was reed before forfeiture could be ordered.
Argued June 20, 1989
Decision released September 5, 1989
In rem proceeding to determine the disposition of a 1984 Chevrolet seized as a result of its alleged use in criminal activity, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, geographical area number seven, and tried to the court, Stanley J.; judgment ordering the vehicle’s forfeiture, from which the owner appealed to this court. No error.
George H. Romania, for the appellant (defendant owner).
Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., deputy assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, and David Strollo, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
O’CONNELL, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment declaring a 1984 Chevrolet Blazer to be a nuisance and ordering the automobile forfeited to the Wallingford police.
The defendant[1] is the owner of the vehicle at issue. He claims that the court erred (1) in failing to find that he had knowledge of the use of his vehicle for illegal purposes, and (2) in ordering the forfeiture in violation of his due process rights because he was an innocent owner. We find no error.
The following facts are pertinent to our resolution of this appeal. On August 2, 1988, Wallingford police
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officers executed a warrant to search the defendant’s vehicle and his two sons. The officers discovered approximately five and one-half grams of cocaine in the glove compartment of the Blazer, and the vehicle was seized pursuant to General Statutes 54-33g.[2] On October 18, 1988, after an in rem hearing, the trial court found the vehicle to be a nuisance, denied the defendant’s motion for its return and ordered it forfeited to the Wallingford police department.
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The defendant’s first claim of error is that the trial court failed to make an explicit finding that the defendant knew of the illegal activities involving the use of his vehicle. He argues that such a finding is a prerequisite to a forfeiture order because the property of an innocent owner is not subject to confiscation under the statute.
The defendant misunderstands the purpose of 54-33g. This statute provides for a civil action in rem, as opposed to a criminal proceeding, to determine whether property has been used in violation of the law and is thus subject to forfeiture. State v. One 1977 Buick Automobile, 196 Conn. 471, 485, 493 A.2d 874 (1985). The guilt or innocence of the owner is not an issue in
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this proceeding. Id.; State v. One 1981 BMW Automobile, 15 Conn. App. 589, 596, 546 A.2d 879 (1988).
Although the application of the statute may result in hardship in some cases; State v. One 1981 BMW Automobile, supra; `[w]hen the statute provides for such forfeiture in unequivocal language, making no exceptions in favor of the claims of innocent owners . . . it must be assumed that the legislature deemed that such enactment was necessary effectively to curb violation of the law, and we cannot impute to it an intent to make the statute less drastic and effective by adopting a strained construction of the language used, and reading into it an exception which does not there appear.’ State v. One 1977 Buick Automobile, supra, quoting Alcorn, State’s Attorney v. Alexandrovicz, 112 Conn. 618, 623, 153 A. 786 (1931). “Any hardship suffered by an innocent owner is incidental to the state’s valid exercise of its sovereign authority to protect its citizens through means reasonably calculated to reduce the violation of the criminal laws.” Id., 486.
The defendant’s reliance on Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974), is unpersuasive. In that case, the United States Supreme Court stated in dicta that it could conceive of two possible situations in which strict application of forfeiture statutes would be inappropriate: (1) when the property subjected to forfeiture had been taken from its owner without his privity or consent; and (2) when an owner proved that he was not involved in nor aware of the wrongful activity, and that he had done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the illegal use of his property.[3] Id., 689.
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We have not found, nor have the parties provided us with any cases in which the Supreme Court’s Calero-Toledo dicta has proved controlling. Moreover, even if we were to find that dicta persuasive, the facts of the present case fail to meet either of two situations described.[4]
The evidence presented at the in rem hearing disclosed that the defendant’s sons made extensive use of the Blazer and had, in fact, installed a tape deck and had kept personal property in the vehicle. Although the defendant testified that his children were required to ask permission before using the vehicle, there was no indication that permission had ever been refused. Thus, the defendant cannot and did not claim that the vehicle had been taken without his consent.
Turning to the second situation mentioned in Calero-Toledo, the trial court made a specific finding that the defendant failed to sustain his burden of establishing that he did all he reasonably could have done to avoid having his vehicle put to an illegal use. We are satisfied that this finding is amply supported by the record. Thus, even if we were to apply the Calero-Toledo dicta to the present case, the defendant’s knowledge of his sons’ illegal use of his vehicle is irrelevant and no explicit finding on this issue was necessary or required.
In light of our resolution of the defendant’s first claim of error, we need not address his second claim.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
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