STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. KENNETH GRAVES.

2008 Ct. Sup. 7418, 45 CLR 435
Nos. CR-06286352, MV-06669397Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New London, Geographic Area 10 at New London
February 26, 2008

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
JAMES W. ABRAMS, JUDGE.

Pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 1, Secs. 7, 8 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution, and Sec. 41-12 of the Connecticut Practice Book, defendant Kenneth Graves seeks to suppress a brown paper bag and its contents recovered by police in an open field in North Stonington, Connecticut on November 20, 2005.

Facts
Defendant Kenneth Graves seeks to suppress evidence seized as a result of a traffic stop in Rhode Island and subsequent automobile chase that ended in Connecticut. A hearing on defendant’s Motion to Suppress was held on February 26, 2008 at which Officer Whewell of the Hopkinton, Rhode Island Police Department and Sergeant Gilman of the Connecticut State Police testified. According to the testimony, on Sunday, November 20, 2005 at about 10:00 am, Officer Whewell was on patrol in Hopkinton, RI, when he sighted defendant’s 1991 Acura going 40 mph in a 25 mph zone. Officer Whewell activated his signals and followed the defendant, who sped up and then turned his car into Briggs Memorial Park in Hopkinton. Defendant eventually stopped his vehicle in a wooded area of the Park that is not visible from the road.

Officer Whewell testified that defendant’s failure to stop, his increase in speed in response to the cruiser’s signal, and defendant’s subsequent pulling into a wooded area that was not visible from the road caused him to be suspicious about defendant’s behavior. At 10:10 a.m., Officer Whewell pulled his vehicle behind defendant’s vehicle and approached defendant’s vehicle. Officer Whewell asked defendant why he had attempted to elude him and defendant did not respond. Officer Whewell next asked defendant why he’d pulled into the wooded area. After some hesitation, defendant indicated that he was attempting to turn around. During this exchange, Officer Whewell noticed a brown paper bag on the passenger seat of defendant’s vehicle. When asked what was in the CT Page 7419 bag, the defendant indicated that it was his lunch. Officer Whewell also testified that he detected the odor of “raw” (i.e., unsmoked) marijuana when defendant lowered the car window. After speaking with the defendant and securing his license and registration, Officer Whewell went back to his cruiser to radio the information to headquarters.

As Officer Whewell sat in the cruiser, defendant left the scene in his vehicle at a high rate of speed, headed toward the Connecticut border, which was less than one mile away. Officer Whewell engaged the defendant in pursuit and during the chase, he radioed the Hopkinton Police Department and requested that they contact the Connecticut State Police regarding the chase. The Hopkinton officer he spoke with indicated that he knew the defendant and his home address. Officer Whewell eventually lost defendant’s trail in North Stonington, Connecticut after a high speed chase of about two miles. At that point, Officer Whewell immediately proceeded to defendant’s home, which was on the same street and less than a mile from where he lost defendant’s trail, where he rendezvoused with two other Hopkinton police officers. They proceeded onto the property, where they located defendant’s vehicle in a wooded area in back. Officer Whewell observed that the brown paper bag was no longer on the passenger seat.

At 10:25 a.m., fifteen minutes after the initial stop, Sergeant Gilman of the Connecticut State Police, who was then the Resident State Trooper in North Stonington, arrived with his police dog. The dog pursued a trail from defendant’s vehicle to the residence. Sergeant Gilman knocked on the door, which was answered by a woman who indicated that she had not seen the defendant. She refused Sergeant Gilman’s request to search the residence.

At this point, Officer Whewell left the premises and retraced the route of the chase, where he discovered the brown paper bag in an open field in North Stonington. He secured the bag, radioed Sergeant Gilman, and turned the bag over to him.

Law
Defendant raises a series of issues regarding the disputed evidence, which the Court will address in seriatim:

A. The Initial Stop Was Constitutionally Valid.
Defendant raises several issues regarding the constitutionality of the initial stop, none of which prove persuasive. Officer Whewell testified that he witnessed defendant exceeding the speed limit. When defendant CT Page 7420 failed to stop and increased his speed in response to Officer Whewell’s signal, followed by his pulling into a wooded area that was not visible from the street, Officer Whewell became increasingly suspicious about defendant’s behavior. A police officer may stop a driver of a vehicle if the officer possesses a reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal behavior has occurred. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). This includes infractions under traffic laws. State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 122 (1988). As a result, the Motion to Suppress based on issues surrounding the initial stop is denied.

B. The Search for Defendant’s Vehicle was Constitutionally Permissible.
A police officer is entitled to engage in activities outside his or her jurisdiction when engaged in “hot pursuit” of a suspected criminal Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). In order for the “hot pursuit” doctrine to apply, the pursuit must be “immediate or continuous.” Id.

In this case, the evidence indicates that the action took place within a very short period as the initial stop began at 10:10 a.m. and that Officer Whewell discovered defendant’s vehicle sometime prior to Sergeant Gilman’s arrival at defendant’s residence at 10:25 a.m. When one accounts for the length of the traffic stop prior to defendant’s flight and the time it took to travel the two-and-a-half miles to defendant’s residence, even at excessive speeds, the lapse of time between Officer Whewell losing defendant’s trail and decision to search for defendant’s vehicle could not have exceeded five minutes.

Defendant argues that at the moment Officer Whewell lost defendant’s trail, he ceased to be in “hot pursuit” and lost any extra-jurisdictional power he might have possessed. However, in order to be constitutionally valid, a “hot pursuit” must be continuou or immediate, not continuous and immediate. Id. The continuity of the pursuit can be broken, provided it remains immediate. In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S 294, 297-98 (1967), the Supreme Court found the warrantless search of a house into which a suspected criminal had reportedly fled some five minutes prior constitutionally permissible. In this case, the search for defendant’s vehicle fell within the “hot pursuit” exception as the close proximity in time between Officer Whewell’s loss of defendant’s trail and his search for defendant’s vehicle rendered the search “immediate.” Defendant’s Motion to Suppress the vehicle search is denied.

CT Page 7421C. The Recovery of the Brown Paper Bag was Constitutionally Permissible.
After leaving defendant’s residence, Officer Whewell retraced the route of the chase, where he discovered the brown paper bag in an open field in North Stonington. Defendants argue that this constituted a warrantless search that did not fall within the “hot pursuit” exception. Defendant is partially correct. By the time Officer Whewell had left the residence, the pursuit of defendant had ended, as it was no longer immediate or continuous. However, locating the bag did not constitute a search for which either a warrant or exigent circumstances are required: “[A]n individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields . . .” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1983). As a result, any officer, or private citizen for that matter, could have retrieved the brown paper bag and turned it over to Connecticut authorities without violating constitutional dictates surrounding unreasonable search and seizure. As a result, defendant’s Motion to Suppress the recovered brown bag is hereby denied.

CT Page 7422