644 A.2d 331
(14837)Supreme Court of Connecticut
CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and KATZ, Js.
Argued May 12, 1994
Decision released June 28, 1994
Motor vehicle misdemeanor complaint charging the defendant with operating a motor vehicle while his license was under suspension for operating under the influence of alcohol, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain, geographical area number twelve, where the court, Schimelman, J., denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint; thereafter, the defendant was presented to the court on a conditional plea of nolo contendere; judgment of guilty, from which the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, Dupont, C.J., Lavery and
Page 825
Freedman, Js., which reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to render judgment of guilty of the lesser included offense of the operating a motor vehicle with a suspended license statute and to resentence the defendant accordingly, and the state, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Leon F. Dalbec, Jr., assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state’s attorney, and Donna Mambrino, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).
Jon L. Schoenhorn, for the appellee (defendant).
PER CURIAM.
The defendant, Arthur E. Jacobson, was arrested on September 22, 1991, for operating a motor vehicle while his operator’s license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes 14-215(c).[1] After a plea of nolo contendere, he was convicted of that charge and sentenced by the trial court to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of thirty days and fined $500. Thereafter, he appealed to the Appellate Court pursuant to General Statutes 54-94a.[2]
Page 826
The Appellate Court concluded that the trial court had improperly convicted and sentenced the defendant for a violation of 14-215(c). State v. Jacobson, 31 Conn. App. 797, 804, 627 A.2d 474 (1993). It determined, however, that the defendant had committed the lesser included offense of violating 14-215(a) and that he was subject to the penalties provided by 14-215(b),[3] which are less severe than those provided by 14-215(c). It, therefore, remanded the case to the trial court for sentencing pursuant to 14-215(b). Id., 806.
We granted certification[4] to consider the issue of whether a defendant, whose motor vehicle operator’s license had been suspended originally because of a violation of General Statutes 14-227a(a)[5] was subject
Page 827
to the enhanced penalties of 14-215(c) when the period of suspension for violation of 14-227a(a) mandated by 14-227a(h)(1)(C)[6] had expired, but his operator’s license had not been restored because of his failure to furnish the commissioner of motor vehicles with proof of financial responsibility pursuant to 14-112.[7]
The Appellate Court, after construing the relevant statutes, concluded that, although the defendant’s operator’s license was under suspension when he was arrested on September 22, 1991, it was not under suspension because of his March 28, 1989 conviction of operating under the influence in violation of 14-227a
Page 828
(a) for which it had been suspended initially. In arriving at its conclusion, the Appellate Court determined that the one year period of suspension mandated by 14-227a(h)(1)(C) had expired by the time of the defendant’s arrest for operating under suspension. State v. Jacobson, supra, 31 Conn. App. 799. The court further concluded that, because the period of suspension imposed for the defendant’s violation of 14-227a
(a) had expired at the time of his arrest in 1991, he was not under suspension at that time “on account of a violation of subsection (a) of section 14-227a,” an essential element for a prosecution pursuant to 14-215(c). Id., 804.
The Appellate Court decided, however, that the defendant’s operator’s license was under suspension at the time of his arrest because he had failed to furnish the commissioner with proof of financial responsibility as required by 14-112 when his suspension, because of a violation of 14-227a, had terminated. The defendant, the court determined, was therefore in violation of 14-215(a) and, consequently, subject to the penalties of 14-215(b). Id.
After considering the briefs and arguments of the parties and examining the record on appeal, we conclude that the judgment of the Appellate Court is correct and must be affirmed. The issue on which we granted certification was properly resolved in the Appellate Court’s thoughtful and thorough unanimous opinion. It would serve no useful purpose for this court to repeat the discussion contained therein. Cf. Board of Education v. State Board of Education, 228 Conn. 433, 436, 636 A.2d 378 (1994); Stankiewicz v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 211 Conn. 76, 78, 556 A.2d 1024
(1989); State v. Leonard, 210 Conn. 480, 481, 556 A.2d 611 (1989).
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
Page 829