STATE v. JUAN L., 291 Conn. 556 (2009)

969 A.2d 698

(SC 18295)Supreme Court of Connecticut

Rogers, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Syllabus
The respondent juvenile was charged in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters with the crimes of sexual assault in the third degree, risk of injury to a child and unlawful restraint in the first degree, and, following a competency examination, that court determined that the respondent was not competent to stand trial and was not restorable to competency. Thereafter, that court concluded that the statute (§ 54-56d
[m]) governing the commitment or release of criminal defendants who have been deemed not competent to stand trial was not applicable in juvenile delinquency proceedings, and rendered judgment dismissing the charges. Thereafter, the state, on the granting of permission, appealed claiming that the trial court improperly determined that § 54-56d (m) does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings and that, therefore, it did not have the authority to transfer the respondent to the custody of the department of developmental services or the department of children and families. Held that § 54-56d (m) applies in delinquency proceedings in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters and that the trial court thus improperly dismissed the matter rather than conducting a disposition hearing pursuant to § 54-56d (m); a review of the legislative history of § 54-56d, including the title and stated purpose of the amending legislation concerning juvenile competency to stand trial, indicated that the legislature intended the statute to apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings, and the application of § 54-56d in juvenile matters proceedings is consistent with the established goals of the juvenile justice system, which include providing treatment for juveniles who appear to pose a risk to themselves or their communities but are incompetent to stand trial.

Argued March 19, 2009

Officially released May 19, 2009

Procedural History
Information charging the respondent juvenile with the crimes of sexual assault in the third degree, risk of injury to a child and unlawful restraint in the first

Page 557

degree, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, Juvenile Matters, where the court, Moore, J., determined that the respondent was not competent to stand trial and was not restorable to competency; thereafter, the court rendered judgment dismissing the charges, and the state, on the granting of permission, appealed Reversed; further proceedings.

James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, state’s attorney, Cara Eschuk, former supervisory assistant state’s attorney, and Margaret Gaffney Radionovas, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the appellant (state).

Jennifer C. Leavitt, deputy assistant public defender, with whom wa Christine Perra Rapillo, executive assistant public defender, for the appellee (respondent).

Opinion
NORCOTT, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether General Statutes § 54-56d
(m), [1] which governs the commitment

Page 558

or release of criminal defendants who are not

Page 559

competent to stand trial, applies in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. The state appeals[2] from the judgment of the trial court dismissing juvenile delinquency proceedings brought against the respondent, Juan L., on the ground that he was not competent to stand trial, and that § 54-56d (m) did not apply in this case. Because we conclude that § 54-56d (m) applies to juvenile matters delinquency proceedings, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following undisputed facts and procedural history. The respondent was born on May 3, 1992. The state charged him with sexual assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-72a, risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21, and unlawful restraint in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95, in connection with an incident that had occurred on or about April 15, 2007, in which he allegedly had engaged in sexual contact with an eight year old male child. The respondent moved pursuant to § 54-56d (c)[3] for a determination of his competency to stand trial. Noting that the court had found the respondent not competent to stand trial on similar charges that had been filed two years earlier, [4] the trial court granted his motion and

Page 560

ordered further evaluation to determine whether there had been any changes to his mental status. See General Statutes § 54-56d (d).[5]
Following an evaluation by Sarah Xavier, a psychiatrist, the trial court held a hearing pursuant to § 54-56d (e), [6] and found that the respondent

Page 561

had proven by a preponderance of the evidence; see General Statutes § 54-56d (b);[7] that he was not competent to stand trial, and that there was “no substantial probability that [the respondent] will regain competence [within the] maximum period allowed by the law.” See General Statutes § 54-56d (f) and (g).[8] The court then continued the matter for ninety days so that the department of children and families and the department of mental retardation[9] could create a final plan for supervising and treating the respondent, who remained on release, but under continuous supervision.

Thereafter, the trial court raised the question of whether it had authority under § 54-56d (m) to transfer the respondent to the custody of the department of mental retardation or the department of children and families. After hearing argument, the court concluded that § 54-56d
(m) did not apply to delinquency proceedings because it does not contain the word “juvenile,” and references to the department of children and families therein pertained to persons whose cases are handied

Page 562

by the adult criminal courts, but nevertheless remain under that department’s statutory jurisdiction. The trial court noted that the only provision relating specifically to competency determinations in juvenile matters proceedings is Practice Book (2007) § 31a-14, [10] which does not set forth a procedure for resolving the case of a juvenile who has been found to be incompetent and nonrestorable. The trial court then concluded that, “since [the respondent] is incompetent, not restorable, and the likelihood that even with services, of that ever changing, it would not be in his best interest to proceed with a delinquency matter at this time.” Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the delinquency proceedings. This appeal followed. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

On appeal, the state claims that the trial court improperly concluded that § 54-56d (m) does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings, and therefore, it did not have the authority under that statute to transfer the respondent to the custody of the department of children and families or the department of mental retardation. Specifically, the state argues that the word “defendant”

Page 563

in § 54-56d (m) includes respondents in juvenile delinquency proceedings because it is a “broad, generic term that does not denote only adult criminal defendants,” and the commitment statutes cross-referenced by §54-56d (m), particularly with respect to the department of children and families, are applicable only to juveniles. Finally, the state notes the relevant legislative history and long-standing juvenile matters practice, and contends that, because juveniles have the same constitutional rights as adults with respect to competency to stand trial in delinquency proceedings, which are quasi-criminal in nature, [11]
construing § 54-56d (m) to apply only in adult criminal court would leave courts without a procedure to aid, and to prevent from reoffending, juveniles who are incompetent to stand trial.

In response, the respondent claims that the trial court properly dismissed the case because § 54-56d (m) clearly and unambiguously does not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings. The respondent argues specifically that § 54-56d is a rule of criminal procedure

Page 564

that is not included within the separate statutory scheme that governs the more flexible juvenile matters courts. The respondent emphasizes that, under General Statutes § 46b-120 (6), [12] juvenile delinquency proceedings are fundamentally different from criminal proceedings because they encompass violations of municipal or local ordinances, in addition to federal and state laws, and do not include the offense classifications and mandatory minimum sentences that are applicable in criminal proceedings. The respondent further argues that the references to the department of children and families in § 54-56d (m) do not mean that the statute must apply to juvenile delinquency respondents, but rather, refer to incompetent, nonrestorable defendants in adult criminal proceedings who remain under that department’s jurisdiction under General Statutes § 17a-3 (a), [13] namely, “`[y]outh[s]'”; General Statutes § 17a-1 (6);[14]

Page 565

or juveniles whose cases are transferred to the adult criminal docket for prosecution under General Statutes § 46b-127.[15] Finally, the respondent contends that, even if § 54-56d is held inapplicable to juvenile matters proceedings, the court still has remedies to address an incompetent, nonrestorable child, namely: (1) referral to the appropriate Probate Court under General Statutes § 17a-76 et seq. to determine whether he should be committed civilly as a danger to himself or others; or (2) an order issued, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-121, [16] to the department of children and families

Page 566

to investigate whether the respondent is a child who is abused, neglected or has unmet special needs. We agree with the state, and conclude that § 54-56d (m) applies in delinquency proceedings in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters.

“The issue in this case . . . raises a question of statutory construction, which is a [question] of law, over which we exercise plenary review. . . . The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply. . . .

“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

Page 567

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v Marsh McLennan Cos., 286 Conn. 454,464-65, 944 A.2d 315 (2008).

We begin with the language of § 54-56d (m), the subsection directly at issue in this appeal. Section 54-56d (m) provides in relevant part: “If at any time the court determines that there is not a substantial probability that the defendant will attain competency within the period of treatment allowed by this section, or if at the end of such period the court finds that the defendant is still not competent, the court shall consider any recommendation made by the examiners pursuant to subsection (d) of this section and any opinion submitted by the treatment facility pursuant to subparagraph (C) of subsection (j) of this section regarding eligibility for, and the appropriateness of, civil commitment to a hospital for psychiatric disabilities and shall either release the defendant from custody or order the defendant placed in the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services, the Commissioner of Children and Families or the Commissioner of Developmental Services. If the court orders the defendant placed in the custody of the Commissioner of Children and Families or the Commissioner of Developmental Services, the commissioner given custody, or the commissioner’s designee, shall then apply for civil commitment in accordance with sections 17a-75 to 17a-83, inclusive, or 17a-270 to 17a-282, inclusive. . . . The

Page 568

court shall hear arguments as to whether the defendant should be released or should be placed in the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services, the Commissioner of Children and Families or the Commissioner of Developmental Services. If the court orders the release of a defendant charged with the commission of a crime that resulted in the death or serious physical injury, as defined in section 53a-3, of another person, or orders the placement of such defendant in the custody of the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services, the court may, on its own motion or on motion of the prosecuting authority, order, as a condition of such release or placement, periodic examinations of the defendant as to the defendant’s competency. . . . A defendant who is not civilly committed as a result of an application made by the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services, the Commissioner of Children and Families or the Commissioner of Developmental Services pursuant to this section shall be released. A defendant who is civilly committed pursuant to such an application shall be treated in the same manner as any other civilly committed person.”

The question in this appeal is whether a respondent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is a “defendant” who is subject to § 54-56d (m). The term “defendant” is not defined by the juvenile matters statutes contained in chapter 815t of the General Statutes, or by the criminal procedure statutes contained in chapters 959 and 960 of the General Statutes, or within the specific confines of § 54-56d. Thus, “[u]nder the rules of statutory construction . . . words and phrases shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language. . . . If a statute or regulation does not sufficiently define a term, it is appropriate to look to the common understanding of the term as expressed in a dictionary.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation

Page 569

marks omitted.) Southern New England Telephone Co. v. Cashman, 283 Conn. 644, 656, 931 A.2d 142 (2007). The dictionary defines “defendant” as “a person required to make answer in a legal action or suit. . . .” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 2001); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004) (defining “defendant” as “[a] person sued in a civil proceeding or accused in a criminal proceeding”). Although a respondent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding clearly is “a person required to make answer in a legal action”; Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th Ed. 2001); the “test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsh McLennan Cos., supra, 286 Conn. 464-65. Thus, we note that the remainder of the language of § 54-56d (m) supports the state’s reading of the statute, particularly the court’s authority to order the defendant placed in the custody of the department of children and families, with a directive to the “commissioner . . . or the commissioner’s designee . . . [then to] apply for civil commitment in accordance with sections 17a-75 to 17a-83, inclusive. . . .” Indeed, the cross-reference to General Statutes §§ 17a-75 through 17a-83, which govern the commitment of a mentally ill child, defined thereunder as “any person less than sixteen years of age”; General Statutes § 17a-75; further indicates that the legislature intended § 54-56d (m) to apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings because the age limitation set forth in those statutes is exactly the same as that contained in the General Statutes pertaining to the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. See General Statutes §§ 46b-120 (1) and 46b-121 (a); see also footnotes 12 and 16 of this opinion.

This statutory language is not, however, clear and unambiguous when viewed in the complete context of

Page 570

the “unambiguous statutory framework” providing that criminal and juvenile proceedings are governed by separate procedures, which “counsels against interpolating into our juvenile justice system a single statute from the laws governing adult criminal procedures.” In re Prudencio O., 229 Conn. 691, 698, 643 A.2d 265 (1994); see id., 699-701 (sixty day period for provision of probable cause hearing under General Statutes § 54-46a is not applicable to juvenile proceedings, and begins to run only when case is transferred to adult criminal docket); see also State v Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 13, 818 A.2d 1 (2003) (“it is axiomatic that delinquency proceedings in juvenile court are fundamentally different from criminal proceedings”); Jennings v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 665-66, 103 A.2d 535 (1954) (considering specific placement of statute in codification as indicative of legislative intent). Thus, given the respondent’s explanation for the references in § 54-56d (m) to the department of children and families, we conclude that the statute is ambiguous, which permits us to consider extratextual sources in its construction.[17]

A review of the legislative history with respect to the amendment of § 54-56d, and specifically subsection (m), to include references to the department of children and families[18] eliminates any doubt that the legislature intended the statute to apply in juvenile delinquency

Page 571

proceedings. First, we note that Public Acts 1983, No. 83-183, § 4, which amended § 54-56d (m) to involve the department of children and families in these proceedings, was entitled: “An Act Concerning Juvenile Competency to Stand Trial.” This is significant, as “[t]he title of legislation when it is acted upon by the legislature is significant and often a valuable aid to construction. . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pondi-Salik, 262 Conn. 746, 755, 817 A.2d 663 (2003); id. (noting that General Statutes § 5-192p
pertaining to state employees retirement system “has since been amended twice and the titles of the amending bills further reflect that the legislature considered this statute part of a retirement scheme”); see also Small v. Going Forward, Inc., 281 Conn. 417, 425-26 n. 5, 915 A.2d 298
(2007) (noting that title of public act may be considered, but that statute’s “boldface catchline . . . is not an appropriate tool for the construction of a statute” because it is prepared by revisors of General Statutes for readers’ convenience).

Second, the legislative history of Public Act 83-183 indicates that it was enacted to fill a procedural void that earlier revisions of § 54-56d
had left with respect to juvenile matters proceedings. Attorney Patricia DeNuzze, a juvenile matters public defender, testified before the judiciary committee in support of the bill enacted as Public Act 83-183, and emphasized that the “purpose of this bill is to provide a procedure for determining [the] competency of the juvenile to stand trial and I want to just emphasize to provide a procedure. There is no procedure now and, as a result, there’s often a jurisdictional gap and other abuses seem to flow from that, both the [c]ourt and the lawyers and the children in the [c]ourts are looking for some sort of guidance as to a standard to determine whether or not a child should be found competent or incompetent to stand trial and to provide a . . . clear reliable mechanism

Page 572

to get that child some services.” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Judiciary, Pt. 2, 1983 Sess., p. 408. Attorney DeNuzze’s testimony is significant because “[i]t is now well settled that testimony before legislative committees may be considered in determining the particular problem or issue that the legislature sought to address by the legislation.”[19] (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jim’s Auto Body v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 285 Conn. 794, 812, 942 A.2d 305
(2008). Thus, the legislative history demonstrates that the legislature intended for the amendments to § 54-56d, including subsection (m), to fill a statutory gap, namely, the lack of a procedure to address competency issues arising in juvenile matters court.

Finally, the application of § 54-56d (m) in juvenile matters proceedings is consistent with the public policy expressed by General Statutes § 46b-121h, [20] namely,

Page 573

“that the juvenile justice system provide individualized supervision, care, accountability and treatment in a manner consistent with public safety to those juveniles who violate the law. The juvenile justice system shall also promote prevention efforts through the support of programs and services designed to meet the needs of juveniles charged with the commission of a delinquent act.” (Emphasis added.) Indeed, the legislature has further emphasized that it is a goal of the juvenile justice system to “[p]rovide secure and therapeutic confinement to those juveniles who present a danger to the community”; General Statutes §46b-121h (2); and to “[a]dequately protect the community and juveniles. . . .” General Statutes § 46b-121h (3). A conclusion that the assessment and commitment mechanisms of § 54-56d apply in juvenile matters proceedings certainly is consistent with the legislature’s vision for a juvenile justice system that encompasses the continued monitoring and treatment of juveniles who appear to pose a risk to themselves or their communities, but are incompetent to stand trial.[21]

Page 574

Accordingly, we conclude that the relevant provisions of § 54-56d, and particularly subsection (m), govern competency questions arising in juvenile matters proceedings. We, therefore, agree with the state that the trial court improperly dismissed this case, rather than conducting a disposition hearing pursuant to § 54-56d (m).

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings according to law.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.