2006 Ct. Sup. 5912
No. CV 05-4008548Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Hartford at Hartford
March 28, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#104)
LOIS TANZER, JUDGE.
This case arises out of an uninsured motorist claim. The defendant, Allstate Insurance Company has moved to strike counts two, four, and five of the complaint filed by the plaintiffs, Malinda Sullivan and Anthony Bonito. The second count of the plaintiffs’ complaint alleges breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The fourth count alleges a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110b(a), et seq. The fifth count alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress (Intentional infliction of emotional distress).
I. Count Two — Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The defendant moves to strike count two of the plaintiffs’ complaint on the grounds that the “plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not sufficiently state a dishonest purpose, evil motive or malice.”
The plaintiffs allege the following facts in count two of their complaint: They are willing to accept “amounts” that the defendant has offered, and that the defendant claimed was reasonable. The defendant failed to pay any money when the defendant knew that the plaintiffs were entitled to compensation. The defendant had sufficient information to justify paying the plaintiffs. The defendant failed to fully investigate the claim. The defendant failed to provide a basis for denying the plaintiffs’ claim, and instead forced the plaintiffs to litigate the entire matter resulting in economic and emotional pains.
“[I]t is axiomatic that the . . . duty of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant implied into a contract or a contractual relationship . . . In other words, every contract carries an CT Page 5913 implied duty requiring that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement . . . The covenant of good faith and fair dealing presupposes that the terms and purpose of the contract are agreed upon by the parties and that what is in dispute is a party’s discretionary application or interpretation of a contract term . . . To constitute a breach of [the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing], the acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff’s right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract must have been taken in bad faith.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) De La Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 269 Conn. 424, 432-33, 849 A.2d 382 (2004). “[B]ad faith . . . implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . . [I]t contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hutchinson v. Farm Family Casualty Ins. Co., 273 Conn. 33, 50 n. 4, 867 A.2d 1 (2005).
The motion to strike count two of the plaintiffs’ complaint for breach of the implied covenant of good faith is granted because the allegations are devoid of supportive facts. See Pote v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 04 0200157 (January 13, 2005, Jennings, J.). “Although all these claims relate to settlement negotiations, there is nothing alleged as to the details of those negotiations or the amount owed that was reasonably clear, or the sufficient information allegedly within defendant’s possession, or the investigation that allegedly should have been performed, or the explanations given that were allegedly unreasonable.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Id.
In addition, there are no facts that support a sinister or dishonest motive. “A mere conclusory allegation of bad faith unsupported by any factual allegations, is insufficient to sustain a claim of bad faith . . . Thus, a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not legally sufficient unless a dishonest purpose or sinister motive is alleged.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Algiere v. Utica National Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 04 0569670 (February 7, 2005, Jones, J.). See also Crespan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,
Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 05 4002121 (January 13, 2006, Pickard, J.,) (holding that although CT Page 5914 the plaintiff’s allegations may be more than mere legal conclusion, they still must make allegations demonstrating some sinister motive or dishonest purpose.)
The defendant’s motion to strike count two of the plaintiffs’ complaint is granted.
II. Count Four — CUTPA
The defendant moves to strike count four of the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that the “plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently demonstrate that Allstate’s actions demonstrated a general business practice as required by CUTPA.” The plaintiffs allege the following additional facts in count four of their complaint for a violation of CUTPA: The defendant, throughout its handling of plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist claim, was and has been in violation of CUTPA, specifically General Statutes §38a-816(15), and the actions by the defendant is not a grouping of isolated acts, but a pattern of conduct that constitutes a business. The defendant was immoral, oppressive, unethical and unscrupulous.
General Statutes § 42-110b(a) provides in relevant part that “[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” In determining whether a practice violates CUTPA, the following criteria is used: “(1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other business persons].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, 275 Conn. 105, 155, 881 A.2d 937 (2005). “[A] CUTPA claim based on an alleged unfair claim settlement practice . . . require[s] proof, as under CUIPA, that the unfair settlement practice had been committed or performed by the defendant with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 229 Conn. 842, 850, 643 A.2d 1282 (1994).
The plaintiffs allege that the defendant engaged in an unfair practice pursuant to a single insurance claim, not with multiple CT Page 5915 instances as required to establish a general business practice under General Statutes § 38a-816(6). Alleged improper conduct in the handling of a single insurance claim, without any allegation of misconduct in the processing of any other claim, does not rise to the level of a general business practice as required by §38a-816(6) of CUIPA. See Lees v. Middlesex Insurance, Co., supra, 229 Conn. 850-51.
The defendant’s motion to strike count four is granted.
III. Count Five — Intentional infliction of emotional distress
The defendant moves to strike count five of the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground that the “plaintiffs have not sufficiently plead the conduct on the part of Allstate was outrageous to maintain their cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.” The plaintiffs allege the following facts in their claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in addition to the allegations already made. The defendant, in attempting to coerce the plaintiffs into reducing their settlement demands and accepting their settlement offers, has engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct, which has caused the plaintiffs to suffer extreme emotional distress and mental anguish. As a direct result of the defendant’s intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiffs have suffered, and will continue to suffer, substantial monetary losses and damages.
In order to maintain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, “[i]t must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 443, 815 A.2d 119 (2003). “Whether a defendant’s conduct is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that it be extreme and outrageous is initially a question for the court to determine.” Appleton v. Board of Education, 254 Conn. 205, 210, 757 A.2d 1059 (2000). “Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” CT Page 5916 (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Little v. Yale University, 92 Conn.App. 232, 239, 884 A.2d 427 (2005), cert. denied, 276 Conn. 936, 891 A.2d 1 (2006).
The plaintiffs’ allegations of their disagreement over the handling or value of the claim do not state a legally sufficient claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Se Ormsby v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 99 0429984, (May 25, 2000, Licari, J.) (holding that conduct such as a disagreement over the value or handling of insurance claim is not so abusive or intolerable to amount to intentional infliction of emotional distress). Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ complaint is too general to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Merely making representations about payments or coercion does not, without more, adequately allege extreme and outrageous conduct. See Dinuzzo v. Bute,
Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 02 0469411 (November 15, 2004, Devlin, J.) (holding that allegations in plaintiff’s “complaint are too general to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress”). For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to strike count five is granted.
IV. Conclusion
The defendant’s motion to strike counts two, four and five of the plaintiffs’ complaint is granted. CT Page 5917