519 A.2d 81
(4731)Appellate Court of Connecticut
DUPONT, C. J., SPALLONE and BIELUCH, Js.
Argued November 7, 1986 —
Decision released December 23, 1986
Appeal from the order of the Probate Court for the district of Shelton, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield where the court, Licari, J., rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Error; further proceedings.
Nathan C. Nasser, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
J. Roger Shall, for the appellee (defendant).
PER CURIAM.
In this case, the plaintiffs’ appeal from the Probate Court was made returnable to the incorrect judicial district. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal because of improper venue.
The trial court, in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, stated in its memorandum of decision that
Page 369
probate appeals are purely statutory and are governed by General Statutes 45-288[1] and 45-290.[2] Pursuant to these statutes, the court found that any defect in the form of an appeal, including improper venue, must be corrected by amendment within ninety days after the date of the probate action being appealed. The trial court held that General Statutes 51-351,[3] which provides a remedy for causes filed at an improper location, did not apply to probate appeals. We disagree.
In Sprague v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 3 Conn. App. 484, 486, 489 A.2d 1064 (1985), we held that the term “cause” as used in 51-351
includes administrative appeals as well as ordinary civil actions. Our analysis in Sprague is applicable to the present case, and we hold that “cause” in 51-351 also applies to appeals from probate.
In its analysis, the trial court reasoned in part that the saving provision of General Statutes 51-351 did not apply because General Statutes 45-290 provided a procedure for curing defective probate appeals. However,
Page 370
the procedures for correcting defective appeals outlined in 45-290 are general and apply to any defect in the form of an appeal. The procedure in 51-351, on the other hand, is specific and is only concerned with saving “causes” returned to an improper location. Under accepted rules of statutory construction, provisions of special applicability take precedence over those of general applicability. Patry v. Board of Trustees, 190 Conn. 460, 468, 461 A.2d 443 (1983); Budkofsky v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 177 Conn. 588, 592, 419 A.2d 333 (1979); Meriden v. Board of Tax Review, 161 Conn. 396, 401-402, 288 A.2d 435 (1971). Under the circumstances in this case, the applicability of the rule is evident. Whereas General Statutes 45-290 applies generally to any defect of a probate appeal, 51-351 applies specifically and only to causes returned to an improper location. Section 51-351, therefore, addressed the precise defect in this case and it was error for the court to conclude that the defect should have been corrected according to the more general provisions of 45-290.
There is error, the judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal is set aside and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law.