2010 Ct. Sup. 10577
No. HDSP-155346Connecticut Superior Court Housing Session J.D. of Hartford at Hartford
June 25, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
GILLIGAN, J.
This is a summary process action for nonpayment of rent brought by the plaintiff, Melvin Thompson, seeking to recover possession of the premises known as 49 Spring St, Unit A-2, Hartford Connecticut (the “Premises”) from the defendant, Vernon J. Leftridge, Jr. . The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action which was heard on February 22, 2010, and denied by written memorandum of decision dated February 23, 2010. The defendant filed an answer and special defenses to which the plaintiff replied and the pleadings were closed. A court trial was held on April 5, 2010. The plaintiff was represented by counsel. The defendant was self-represented.
BACKGROUND
This is the second summary process action brought by the plaintiff to recover possession of the Premises. The defendant filed two housing code enforcement actions pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes Section 47a-14h arising out of the parties’ landlord-tenant relationship, (Docket Nos. HCH 569 and HCH 574), both of which were dismissed for failure to pay the rent into court.
The parties entered into an oral month-to-month lease of the premises at a rental rate of $1,100 per month. The plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the defendant failed to pay rent for the months of November 2009 and December 2009.
FINDINGS
The court has weighed all the evidence and assessed the testimony and credibility of the witnesses. Based on the evidence, testimony and a review of the pleadings, the court makes the following findings.
THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM OF NONPAYMENT CT Page 10578
The landlord has proved, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, all the elements of the summary process action based on nonpayment of rent for the month of December 2009.
THE DEFENDANT’S SPECIAL DEFENSES
The defendant’s answer to the plaintiff’s complaint asserted several special defenses. “Under our practice, when a defendant pleads a special defense, the burden of proof of the allegations contained therein is on the defendant.” Dubose v. Carabetta, 161 Conn. 254, 262, 287 A.2d 357
(1971). By alleging the special defenses, the defendant assumes the burden of proving the same.
The defendant’s first special defense is that the conditions in the apartment rendered it uninhabitable and excused the payment of rent.
The City of Harford conducted five inspections of the premises including follow-up inspections. City of Hartford housing inspector, Diane Maldonado, testified that she received a complaint from the defendant on September 23, 2009 concerning the failure to provide a mail box key, [1] the presence of centipedes and water damage in one of the bathrooms in the apartment. Maldonado conducted her inspection of the apartment the same day. Maldonado testified that she saw only one centipede behind a picture on a wall. She testified that she observed a water condition on the shower wall but testified that she was not able or qualified to determine if there was a mold condition. She also observed and cited the plaintiff for failing to have a viewing device on the entrance door.
The defendant also claimed that he had problems with the kitchen stove. The plaintiff testified that, prior to the defendant’s occupancy, he advised the defendant that he did not provide a stove or refrigerator in the unit. The defendant was informed that the stove and refrigerator in the apartment were abandoned by the previous tenant and that the plaintiff would either remove them or leave them at the defendant’s option. The defendant chose to keep the appliances and the court finds that any problems concerning their condition or operation were not the responsibility of the plaintiff.
Maldonado testified that the defendant filed a complaint on October 2, 2009 that the heat in the apartment was not adequate. Maldonado inspected the apartment the same day and found the complaint to be unfounded.
CT Page 10579 Maldonado testified that the defendant filed a complaint on December 18, 2009 of insufficient heat and Maldonado conducted an inspection. Maldonado testified that, from her recollection, the heat in the apartment was below sixty-five degrees. Maldonado re-inspected the apartment on December 30, 2009 and found the temperature in the apartment to be in compliance.
Maldonado testified that, based on the findings from her inspections, the conditions in the Premises complained of by the defendant did not render the apartment uninhabitable. Based on the evidence and testimony adduced at trial, the court finds that the conditions in the Premises complained of did not relieve the defendant of the obligation to pay rent. See Visco v. Cody, 16 Conn. App. 444, 547 A.2d 935 (1988).
The defendant also asserted the defense of retaliatory eviction. Since the action was brought for nonpayment of rent, rather than lapse of time, the special defense is not available to the defendant in this action. See C.G.S. § 47a-20a(a)(1).
The defendant raised as an additional special defense to the action that he is physically disabled. The defendant not only offered no proof that he is physically disabled as defined in C.G.S. § 1-1f, but this special defense is only available in a summary process action brought for lapse of time, not in an action brought for nonpayment of rent.
The defendant offered testimony from Socnite Sebourne that rent for the month of December was offered to the plaintiff at some time in December but the offer was not accepted. The defendant did not assert this claim as a special defense in his answer to the summary process complaint. Moreover, Sebourne testified that she stayed at the premises on a regular basis and was in a dating relationship with the defendant. The court finds Sebourne’s testimony unconvincing and insufficiently specific to be credited.
CONCLUSION
The court finds that the plaintiff has sustained the burden to prove the elements of the action by a preponderance of the evidence. The court further finds that the defendant has failed to prove any special defense to the action by a preponderance of the evidence, as required. Having considered the law and equity, the court enters judgment for immediate possession of the premises in favor of the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. CT Page 10580
CT Page 10581