627 A.2d 932
(14719) (14723)Supreme Court of Connecticut
BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, Js.
The plaintiff, the owner of certain property located in the defendant towns of New Fairfield and Sherman, appealed in each case from the reassessment of that property. The property in question had been classified by the state forester as forest land pursuant to statute (12-107d), but the assessor of each town declassified the parcels when the property was transferred to the plaintiff pursuant to the dissolution of a corporation in which the plaintiff was the sole shareholder. No consideration was paid for the transfer, and no conveyance tax was paid. The trial court rendered judgment sustaining the appeals, from which the defendants appealed. Held: 1. The defendants could not prevail on their claim that because the plaintiff did not first appeal to each town’s board of tax review, the trial court lacked jurisdiction; a direct appeal to the Superior Court is authorized by statute (12-119) where, as here, a plaintiff claims that an assessment is “manifestly excessive” and was arrived at by “disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property.” 2. Because the use of the property had not changed and because the corporation transferred title to the property to the plaintiff for no consideration, the trial court properly concluded that the defendants did not have the authority to declassify it; by statute (12-504h), land that has been classified as forest land pursuant to 12-107d remains so classified until either the use of the property has been changed or until such land is sold, and the “sale” of property is a transfer of title for a price.
Argued May 6, 1993
Decision released July 13, 1993
Appeal, in each case, from each defendant’s assessment of certain real property owned by the plaintiff and located in the respective towns, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Danbury, where the cases were consolidated and tried to the court, Fuller, J.; judgment sustaining the appeals, from which the defendants filed separate appeals to the Appellate
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Court, which granted the motion filed by the defendant town of New Fairfield to consolidate the appeals; thereafter, the appeals were transferred to this court. Affirmed.
Michael N. LaVelle, for the appellants (defendants).
Henry W. Pascarella, with whom, on the brief, was Barry C. Hawkins, for the appellee (plaintiff).
PALMER, J.
This appeal requires us to decide whether municipal tax assessors may declassify property as forest land upon the transfer of the property, pursuant to a corporate dissolution, from a corporation to its sole shareholder without consideration.[1] The trial court concluded that the distribution of assets from the dissolved corporation did not authorize declassification of the property and sustained the plaintiff’s tax appeals. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The parties do not dispute the underlying facts relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff, Timber Trails Associates, is the owner of 281 acres in the town of New Fairfield, and 673.2 acres in the town of Sherman. In the early 1970s, upon application by Timber Trails Corporation (corporation), the plaintiff’s predecessor in title, the state forester had classified these two abutting parcels as forest land pursuant to General Statutes 12-107d.[2] In 1988, the corporation was dissolved
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and transferred all of its assets, including the forest land, to the plaintiff, the only stockholder of the corporation. The real estate conveyance statements provided that no consideration had been received for the deeds,[3] and neither town clerk collected a conveyance tax.
The state forester, upon notification of the change of the owner of record of the property, issued to the plaintiff a certificate that continued the designation of the parcels as forest land.[4] Because the state forester had continued the property’s designation as forest land, the plaintiff did not apply for classification of the parcels as forest land on the assessment lists of the
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defendants. The defendants maintained that the transfer of the land from the corporation to the plaintiff had terminated the classification of the property as forest land under General Statutes 12-504h.[5] The assessors subsequently declassified the parcels and changed the basis of the property’s assessment from current use value to fair market value pursuant to General Statutes 12-63.[6] The New Fairfield and Sherman parcels had been assessed as forest land with current use values of $19,495 and $67,320, respectively, and were reassessed after the declassification at $606,140 and $1,975,700, respectively. As a result, the property tax levied on the New Fairfield parcel increased from $791.50 to $24,609.28, and the property tax on the Sherman parcel increased from $807.84 to $23,710. The plaintiff appealed the assessments of the land to the Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes 12-119.[7]
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The court sustained both appeals, concluding that the land had remained classified as forest land for assessment purposes because the assessors lacked the authority to declassify it. In this court the defendants claim that: (1) the trial court improperly concluded that the plaintiff could appeal directly to it without first appealing to the defendants’ boards of tax review; and (2) 12-504h did not permit the defendants to declassify the property as forest land upon its transfer without consideration pursuant to the corporate dissolution.
I
The defendants contend initially that the plaintiff was required to appeal the assessors’ decisions on the declassification of the forest land to the boards of tax review pursuant to General Statutes 12-111 before appealing to the Superior Court pursuant to Public Acts 1991, No. 91-221, 4 (P.A. 91-221).[8] We disagree.
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General Statutes 12-107d (g) provides that “[a]n owner of land aggrieved by the denial of any application to the assessor of a municipality for classification of land as forest land shall have the same rights and remedies for appeal and relief as are provided in the general statutes for taxpayers claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of assessors or boards of tax review.” Section 12-111 authorizes “any person . . . claiming to be aggrieved by the doings of the assessors” to appeal to the board of tax review; see Marshall v. Newington, 156 Conn. 107, 114, 239 A.2d 478 (1968); and, at the time in question P.A. 91-221, 4 (now codified at General Statutes 12-117a), authorized an appeal to the Superior Court “by any person claiming to be aggrieved by an action of the board of tax review.” Id.; see also Northeast Datacom, Inc. v. Wallingford, 212 Conn. 639, 649-50, 563 A.2d 688 (1989). The defendants argue that because the plaintiff was aggrieved by the assessors’ recalculation of the property taxes on the basis of fair market value, the plaintiff’s remedy was an appeal to each defendant’s board of tax review pursuant to 12-111. The defendants contend that because the plaintiff could appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to P.A. 91-221, 4, only upon an adverse decision by a board of tax review, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiff’s direct appeal from the actions of the town assessors.
Neither 12-111 nor P.A. 91-221, 4, proscribes, however, an appeal to the Superior Court pursuant to 12-119 in a proper case. Section 12-119 expressly provides that an owner may appeal to the Superior Court “a tax laid on property . . . computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property . . . .” See also Second Stone Ridge Cooperative Corporation
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v. Bridgeport, 220 Conn. 335, 341-42, 597 A.2d 326
(1991), and cases cited therein. The plaintiff claims that the defendants disregarded the statutory provisions entitling the plaintiff to the continued designation of the parcels as forest land, and that, therefore, the defendants’ calculation of the property taxes on the basis of fair market value rather than current use value was improper. The assessors’ alleged improper valuations resulted in a tax assessment by each defendant that is approximately thirty times greater than the plaintiff had been required to pay prior to the declassification of the property. Because the plaintiff has claimed that the assessments were both “manifestly excessive” and “arrived at . . . by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property,” the plaintiff’s appeals directly to the Superior Court pursuant to 12-119 were proper.[9]
II A
The defendants next argue that the trial court improperly concluded that General Statutes 12-504h
did not permit them to declassify forest land that had been transferred without consideration pursuant to a corporate dissolution. This claim is not supported, however, by the plain language of 12-504h, which
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provides that once property has been classified as forest land pursuant to 12-107d, it “shall remain so classified without the filing of any new application subsequent to such classification . . . until either of the following shall occur: (1) The use of such land is changed to a use other than that described in the application for the existing classification by [the] record owner, or (2) such land is sold by [the] record owner.” The property could not have been reclassified pursuant to 12-504h (1), because it is undisputed that the use of the land has not changed. Nor would reclassification of the property have been permitted under 12-504h (2), because the land was not “sold” by the corporation to the plaintiff. In this context, “sold” means more than “conveyed.” A “sale” of property is a “transfer of the absolute title thereinfor a price.” (Emphasis added.) Guilford-Chester Water Co. v. Guilford, 107 Conn. 519, 527, 141 A. 880 (1928). On the other hand, to “convey” real estate means simply “to transfer the legal title to it from the present owner to another [by an appropriate instrument].” Abendroth v. Greenwich, 29 Conn. 356, 365 (1860). Because the corporation transferred the forest land to the plaintiff for no consideration, the trial court properly concluded that the property had not been “sold by [the] record owner” as required by 12-504h (2).
The defendants contend also that General Statutes 12-504a, 12-504b and 12-504c allow termination of the forest land classification on other grounds. We are not persuaded.
Section 12-504a (b)[10] provides for a conveyance tax on any land classified as forest land that is sold within
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ten years of classification or acquisition, and the recording of the deed and payment of the conveyance tax triggers the automatic declassification of the land pursuant to 12-504b. The defendants conceded, however, that 12-504a (b) does not apply to a conveyance after the ten year recapture period expires. The trial court properly concluded, therefore, that, because the land had been classified as forest land for more than ten years prior to the dissolution of the corporation, 12-504a (b) is inapposite in these circumstances. Section 12-504b[11]
requires the payment of the conveyance tax prior to the recording of the deed for the sale of forest land. Because the transfer in the present case, however, was not subject to the conveyance tax, 12-504b does not apply.
Section 12-504c[12] identifies exemptions to the conveyance tax required by 12-504a. The defendants
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argue that the transfer of real property for no consideration in connection with a corporate dissolution is not one of the several exemptions specified in the statute and that the assessors, therefore, could properly have declassified the parcels. Because no conveyance tax was due pursuant to 12-504a, however, the issue of exemptions under 12-504c is irrelevant to our analysis. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court properly determined that 12-504h rather than 12-504a, 12-504b
or 12-504c applied in these circumstances.
B
The defendants’ final contention is that the transfers of the property from the corporation to the plaintiff automatically terminated the property’s forest land classification pursuant to 12-504f, which provides that a classification of property as forest land “shall be
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deemed personal to the particular owner who requests such classification and shall not run with the land.”[13]
The defendants argue that the claimed termination of the classification of property as forest land required the plaintiff to file a new application with the defendants for assessment purposes pursuant to 12-107d. Section 12-504f, however, concerns the issuance and recording of certificates identifying property as forest land for the purpose of the “obligation to pay the conveyance tax imposed by this chapter.” In light of our conclusion that no conveyance tax was due pursuant to 12-504a (b), 12-504f is inapposite.
The construction of 12-504f urged by the defendants, moreover, conflicts with the plain language of 12-504h, which provides that land classified as forest land remains so classified “without the filing of any new application subsequent to such classification” until either the use of the land is changed or the land is sold. Neither condition had occurred and the state forester had continued the designation of the property as forest land after the transfer of the property to the plaintiff. In these circumstances, the assessors were required to continue the classification of the property as forest land for assessment purposes pursuant to 12-107d (c).
Accordingly, we conclude that the state forester properly continued the property’s forest land designation
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pursuant to the unambiguous direction of 12-504h and that the defendants were without authority to declassify it. Because the reassessments of the property based upon the improper declassifications were manifestly excessive, the trial court properly sustained the plaintiff’s appeals pursuant to 12-119.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
generally is not a substitute for a timely appeal to a board of tax review pursuant to P.A. 91-221, 4 (now General Statutes 12-117a), when a property owner seeks to contest an assessor’s alleged overvaluation. See Northeast Datacom, Inc. v. Wallingford, 212 Conn. 639, 649-50, 563 A.2d 688 (1989); E. Ingraham Co. v. Bristol, 146 Conn. 403, 408-409, 151 A.2d 700 (1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 929, 80 S.Ct. 367, 4 L.Ed.2d 352
(1960). Indeed, “512-119 requires an allegation that something more than mere valuation is at issue.” Second Stone Ridge Cooperative Corporation v. Bridgeport, 220 Conn. 335, 340, 597 A.2d 326 (1991); see also Connecticut Coke Co. v. New Haven, 169 Conn. 663, 674-75, 364 A.2d 178 (1975).