612 A.2d 778
(10610)Appellate Court of Connecticut
DUPONT, C.J., FOTI and FREEDMAN, Js.
The defendant L, who had been defaulted by the trial court for failure to plead, appealed to this court from that court’s judgment of strict foreclosure of a certain mortgage. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying L’s motion to set aside the default; the record clearly established that the sole purpose of the motion was to delay the proceedings so that counsel for L might negotiate a better result for his client.
Argued May 1, 1992
Decision released July 21, 1992
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Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where the court, Dunn, J., granted the plaintiff’s motion for default; thereafter, the court, Scheinblum, J., denied the named defendant’s motion to open the default and granted the plaintiff’s motion for strict foreclosure and rendered judgment thereon, from which the named defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.
William F. McDonald, with whom was John H. Parks, for the appellant (named defendant).
Jerome F. Levine, for the appellee (plaintiff).
FOTI, J.
The named defendant,[1] Robert G. Larson, appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly rendered judgment after refusing to set aside a default for failure to plead. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are pertinent to our decision. In February, 1991, the plaintiff commenced a foreclosure action against a number of defendants, all of whom were defaulted. The defendant Robert G. Larson appeared pro se and was subsequently defaulted in May, 1991, for failure to plead. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment of strict foreclosure on July 12, 1991. On August 5, 1991, Attorney John H. Parks filed an appearance for the defendant. A hearing on the plaintiff’s motion for judgment was scheduled on the short calendar list for Monday, August 19, 1991. On that morning, prior to the 10 a.m. short calendar, the defendant filed an answer to the complaint, in which he claimed to have insufficient knowledge or information
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on which to form a belief as to each and every paragraph. The answer was dated August 16, 1991, and certified as having been mailed to all counsel of record on August 17, 1991. Counsel for the plaintiff protested to the court that he had no prior notice or knowledge of the answer and sought to proceed on his motion. The court then asked Parks whether he wanted to have the court set aside the default. The court received no response to this question. The clerk then noted on the defendant’s answer, “8-19-91 Default not reopened (Scheinblum, J.)” and signed the notation. The plaintiff then provided the court with the original promissory note and mortgage deed, an affidavit of debt dated August 15, 1991, and an original appraisal report performed by Robert G. Stewart. The defendant was given the opportunity, through counsel, to question the appraiser, but counsel declined the offer. The court rendered a judgment of strict foreclosure and set law days beginning October 23, 1991.
The defendant claims that pursuant to Practice Book 363A[2] the clerk should have set aside the default for failure to plead because he filed an answer before judgment was rendered, and that, therefore, judgment could not have been rendered.[3]
“The design of the rules of practice is both to facilitate business and to advance justice; `they will be interpreted liberally in any case where it shall be manifest that a strict adherence to them will work surprise or
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injustice.'” Snow v. Calise, 174 Conn. 567, 574, 392 A.2d 440 (1978); Practice Book 6. “Rules of practice must be construed reasonably and with consideration of this purpose. . . . Rules `are a means to justice, and not an end in themselves; their purpose is to provide for a just determination of every proceeding.'” (Citations omitted.) In re Dodson, 214 Conn. 344, 363, 572 A.2d 328, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 896, 111 S.Ct. 247, 112 L.Ed.2d 205 (1990).
Applying these principles to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the court acted reasonably. The record is clear that the sole purpose of the attempt to open the default was to delay the proceedings so that counsel for the defendant might negotiate a better result with the plaintiff.[4] The delay was sought in the hope of working something out “as a package deal on two properties.”
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“[W]e would be reluctant to find an abuse of discretion [for failing to set aside the default and rendering judgment] and to remand . . . where there is nothing in the record to suggest that a meritorious defense may exist.” Burritt Mutual Savings Bank of New Britain v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 369, 374, 439 A.2d 396 (1981). We note that the defendant’s answer claimed insufficient knowledge on which to form a belief as to each and every paragraph of the complaint, including allegations that the defendant had signed the promissory note and mortgage deed. It is obvious that unless the defendant is incapacitated or otherwise unavailable to his attorney, such information is within his knowledge so as to require an admission or denial.
“`Courts have an inherent power to disregard pleadings which have been interposed for the purpose of thwarting the orderly progress of a case.'” Friedlander v. Friedlander, 191 Conn. 81, 91, 463 A.2d 587
(1983); Burritt Mutual Savings of New Britain v. Tucker, supra, 373.
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We will not elevate form over substance. The defendant’s sole purpose was delay. He has failed to suggest any defense of at least arguable merit. He was also given full opportunity to participate in the proceedings on the plaintiff’s motion for judgment of foreclosure, having conceded that no equity existed in the property.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.