CASE NO. 802 CRD-7-88-12Workers’ Compensation Commission
MAY 25, 1990
The claimant appeared pro se.
The respondent was represented by George N. Nichols, Esq., Durant, Sabanosh, Nichols Houston.
This Petition for Review from the December 12, 1988 Finding of the Commissioner for the Seventh District was heard February 2, 1990 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners James Metro and George Waldron.
OPINION
JOHN ARCUDI, CHAIRMAN.
Respondents question the commissioner’s award of Sec. 31-284b fringe benefits. They argue (1)Sec. 31-284b C.G.S. is invalid since it is preempted by federal law and (2) that section only covers claimant’s benefits and not benefits for dependents.
The first argument that Sec. 31-284b is preempted by the ERISA federal statutory scheme asks us to consider the constitutionality of our 1982 statute. As most recently noted in Ferrillo v. O G Industries, Inc., 783 CRD-3-88-10 (February 21, 1990), we are a tribunal of limited statutory jurisdiction and lack authority to decide such an issue. For the reasons there stated we will not consider constitutionality.
The second issue directly concerns the order to provide health and dental insurance for the claimant and her dependents. Here, the respondents assume arguendo the constitutional validity of Sec. 31-284b
but allege the commissioner misapplied its provisions. Sec. 31-284b(1a) C.G.S. provides in pertinent part “In order to maintain, as nearly as possible, the income of employees who suffer employment-related injuries, any employer, . . . who provides accident and health insurance or life insurance coverage for any employee . . . shall provide to such employee equivalent insurance coverage . . . while the employee is eligible to receive or is receiving workers’ compensation payments.” Respondents contend that Sec. 31-284b requires an employer to continue health insurance benefits only for an employee and does not require continued coverage for dependents.
They contend that the language “shall provide to such employee equivalent insurance coverage” limits such coverage to employees and does not mandate coverage for dependents. Their further disingenuous argument is that the definition of employee in Sec. 31-275(5) does not encompass dependents who are defined in Sec. 31-275(4).
What they fail to note is that the 1982 legislation creating Sec. 31-284b, P.A. 82-398, also included a provision, now contained in Sec. 31-275(14), defining an employee’s renumeration: “`Income’ means all forms of renumeration to an individual from his employment, including wages, accident and health insurance coverage, life insurance coverage and employee welfare plan contributions.” It is that same word “income” which is tracked at the beginning of Sec. 31-284b when the statutory intention is declared “to maintain, as nearly as possible, the income of employees.” In the ordinary family situation a worker is the breadwinner, or at least one of the breadwinners supporting a family of dependents. The raison d’etre for work is to earn income to support the family and the dependents. Part of the worker’s income goes to provide the medical services to keep the family and its dependents in good health. When the worker is injured, the medical services to heal the injury is already being paid by the employer. It is thus not the worker’s own medical services which are at issue in the continuation of health insurance coverage. It is the family coverage and its continuance which is addressed by Sec. 31-284b, including that of the spouse who is not even a dependent under Sec. 31-308b. The family coverage is part of the worker’s income which is to be maintained.
We therefore affirm the ruling below and dismiss the appeal.
Commissioners James Metro and George Waldron concur.