VELILLA v. UTC/HAMILTON STANDARD DIV., 416 CRD-1-85 (2-19-86)


GILBERT VELILLA, CLAIMANT-APPELLANT vs. UTC/HAMILTON STANDARD DIVISION EMPLOYER and LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INSURER, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES

CASE NO. 416 CRD-1-85Workers’ Compensation Commission
FEBRUARY 19, 1986

The Claimant-Appellant appeared pro se.

The Respondents-Appellees were represented by Brian Prindle, Esq.

This Petition for Review from the July 12, 1985 Finding and Dismissal of the Commissioner at Large, Acting for the First District was argued on January 31, 1986 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi and Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and Michael S. Sherman.

OPINION

JOHN ARCUDI, Chairman.

Claimant has here appealed pro se but was represented by counsel in the 1984 hearing before the Commissioner at Large. The issues in dispute arise from a 1974 compensable injury which was the subject of an August, 1979 Finding and Award by the First District Commissioner. An appeal from the 1979 ruling was dismissed by the Superior Court in 1980. Subsequently, claimant filed a federal suit pro se alleging denial of civil rights and violation of constitutional due process against the respondents and the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner.

The U.S. District Court suit was dismissed. Appeals to the U.S. Circuit Court and the U.S. Supreme Court also proved unavailing. In 1983 claimant requested further hearing in the First District claiming in the alternative either total disability or specific disability benefits and benefits for disfigurement. The Commissioner of the First District recused himself causing the Commissioner at Large to hear the matter in 1984 and issue a decision denying the claim July 12, 1985.

We have examined all the evidence presented in the 1984 and 1985 proceedings. Although we admire the cogent manner in which claimant has presented argument in all his pro se efforts, we are unable to grant the relief he seeks. For him to have succeeded in this new 1983 claim, he needed to present evidence of a change in circumstances concerning his disability status.[1] The burden of persuasion was on him to satisfy the trial Commissioner of this. Wysocki v. Bradley Hubbard Co., 113 Conn. 170 (1931), Henderson v. Mazzotta, 113 Conn. 747
(1931), Meadow v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 134 Conn. 269
(1948), Makris v. Chase Brass Copper Co., 136 Conn. 340 (1949). He failed to do this. In fact one of his principal expert witnesses, Dr. Lawrence Metz of Springfield, Massachusetts, a board certified neurologist testified that in large part there was no change in symptoms between 1979 and 1984.

Thus, there was sufficient evidentiary basis for the Commissioner to rule as he did. We as an appellate tribunal cannot substitute our conclusions for the Commissioner’s unless he has found facts without evidence or could not reasonably reach the conclusions he stated. Powers v. Hotel Bond Co., 89 Conn. 143 (1915), Battey v. Osborne, 96 Conn. 633
(1921), Adzima v. UAC/Norden Division, 177 Conn. 107 (1979).

Therefore, this appeal is dismissed, and the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.

Commissioners Gerald Kolinsky and Michael S. Sherman concur with this opinion.

[1] Sec. 31-315. Modification of award or voluntary agreement. Any award of, or voluntary agreement concerning, compensation made under the provisions this chapter shall be subject to modification, upon the request of either party and in accordance with the procedure for original determinations, whenever it appears to the compensation commissioner, after notice and hearing thereon, that the incapacity of an injured employee has increased, decreased or ceased, or that the measure of dependence on account of which the compensation is paid has changed, or that changed conditions of fact have arisen which necessitate a change of such agreement or award in order properly to carry out the spirit of this chapter. The commissioner shall also have the same power to open and modify an award as any court of the state has to open and modify a judgment of such court. The compensation commissioner shall retain jurisdiction over claims for compensation, awards and voluntary agreements, for any proper action thereon, during the whole compensation period applicable to the injury in question.