2004 Ct. Sup. 6836
No. CV03 0480706SConnecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
May 3, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (#107)
ARNOLD, JUDGE.
The plaintiff Vissicchio has filed a motion to strike the apportionment complaint of the defendants Kelly Moffat and Greg Moffat arguing that the apportionment complaint is legally insufficient in that it seeks to apportion liability to a person, the plaintiff Vissicchio, who is already a party to the present action.
This is a personal injury action resulting from a chain reaction motor vehicle accident on September 1, 2001. The plaintiff alleges that she was operating her motor vehicle behind a line of traffic which had come to a halt on the highway when her motor vehicle was struck from behind by the defendant Greenspan. This then caused the plaintiff’s vehicle to collide with the vehicle directly in front of her. The plaintiff claims that this collision, set in force by the defendant Greenspan, resulted in personal injuries to the plaintiff and her passenger, Consetta Mastriano. The plaintiff Vissicchio and her passenger, Mastriano entered suit on July 28, 2003, naming Greenspan as a defendant and Kelly and Greg Moffat as co-defendants. Kelly and Greg Moffat were the operator and owner respectively of a vehicle which struck the rear of the Greenspan vehicle, causing the Greenspan vehicle to collide with the plaintiff Vissicchio’s vehicle.
By way of an apportionment complaint, dated October 10, 2003, bearing a return date of November 25, 2003, defendants Kelly and Greg Moffat seek to apportion liability against Vissicchio as to the claims asserted by the plaintiff passenger, Mastriano, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-102b and 52-572h.
The law regarding a motion to strike is well-settled. “The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon CT Page 6837 which relief can be granted.” Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). A motion to strike shall be granted if “the plaintiff’s complaint [does not] sufficiently [state] a cognizable cause of action as a matter of law.” Mora v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 13 Conn. App. 208, 211, 535 A.2d 390
(1988).
A motion to strike “admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. “A motion to strike is properly granted where a plaintiff’s complaint alleges legal conclusions unsupported by facts.” Id. “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.” Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 170, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988). A motion to strike “is to be tested by the allegations of the pleading demurred to, which cannot be enlarged by the assumption of any fact not therein alleged.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541-50, 427 A.2d 822 (1980).
Upon deciding a motion to strike, the trial court must construe the “plaintiff’s complaint in [a] manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.” Bouchard v. People’s Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). “The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail.” Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 108-09. However, if the plaintiff has alleged mere conclusions of law unsupported by the requisite facts, the motion to strike should be granted. Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank, 188 Conn. 281, 285, 449 A.2d 986 (1982).
The defendants Moffat argue that it is permissible to file an apportionment complaint against an existing party to an action. See, Torres v. Begic, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 423742 (June 13, 2000, Levin, J.) (27 Conn. L. Rptr. 403); Farmer v. Christianson, Superior Court of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. CV 00 71954 (May 4, 2000, Sullivan, J.) (27 Conn. L. Rptr. 196); Sharif v. Peck, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, No. 429034 (March 27, 2001) (Blue, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 311). CT Page 6838
There is a split of authority among superior court judges on this issue, but the majority of decisions of the superior court hold that § 52-102b does not permit the filing of an apportionment complaint against persons already party to an action. See DiLorenzo v. Reardon, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 12839 (May 15, 1996) (Murray, J.) (16 Conn. L. Rptr. 587); Adams v. Crowder, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 356975 (August 3, 1995) (Zoarski, J.); Voog v. Lindsay, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 313610 (March 22, 1994) (Flynn, J.) (11 Conn. L. Rptr. 169); Miano v. Bazzano, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 510509 (January 27, 1993) (Hale, J.T.R.) (8 Conn. L. Rptr. 284); Algea v. Barnett, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. 334396 (July 17, 1997) (Skolnick, J.) (20 Conn. L. Rptr. 100); Cullen v. Czaikowski, Superior Court, judicial District of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 417339 (April 12, 1999) (Jones, J.) (24 Conn. L. Rptr. 357); Apicelli v. Indian Nations, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. 119305 (December 11, 2000) (Martin, J.); Rubbak v. Thompson,
Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 0180009 (April 6, 2001) (Lewis, J.) (29 Conn. L. Rptr. 316); Pryce v. Keane, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. 0806961 (July 20, 2001) (Berger, J.); Demosthene v. Spignolio, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 0186792 (July 24, 2002), discussing misplaced reliance on Donner v. Kearse, 234 Conn. 660, 662 A.2d 1269 (1995); Evans v. Spinelli, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. 0279651 (February 10, 2003) (Wiese, J.) (34 Conn. L. Rptr. 52); Ayalon v. Breakstone, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford at Milford, No. CV02 078878 (Dec. 5, 2003) (Cremis, J.).
The question of whether an apportionment complaint can be served on a present party to an action is a matter of statutory interpretation. The rules regarding statutory interpretation are well-settled. The court must approach the questions raised regarding the interpretation of statutes according to the well-established principles of statutory construction designed to further the fundamental objective of ascertaining and giving effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986). The court must look to the words of the statute; to the legislative CT Page 6839 history; the circumstances surrounding its enactment; to the legislative policy it was designed to implement; and to its relationship to existing legislation and any common law principles governing the same subject matter. Dart Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 202 Conn. 566, 572, 522 A.2d 763 (1987); Texaco Refining Marketing Co. v. Commissioner, 202 Conn. 583, 589, 522 A.2d 771 (1987); State v. Jason B., 248 Conn. 543, 729 A.2d 760
(1999).
With any issue of statutory interpretation, our initial guide is the language of the statute itself. Frillici v. Westport, 231 Conn. 418, 430-32, 650 A.2d 557 (1994). If its language in drafting and enacting a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for alteration of the legislative decision by the judicial branch . . . Ambriose v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 226 Conn. 757, 764-65 (1993). It is assumed that the words themselves express the intent of the legislature. Mazur v. Blum, 184 Conn. 116, 118-19, 441 A.2d 65 (1981). “A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity.” State v. Perruccio, 192 Conn. 154, 163 n. 4, 471 A.2d 632 CT Page 7581 (1984).
“A corollary of the above rule of construction is that the intent of the legislature is to be found not in what the legislature meant to say, but in the meaning of what it did say.”Burnham v. Administrator, 184 Conn. 317, 325, 439 A.2d 1008
(1981). The words used in statutes “shall be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language.” Simmonette v. Great American Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 466, 471, 338 A.2d 453
(1973); Caulkins v. Petrillo, 200 Conn. 208, 215-16, 510 A.2d 1329 (1986).
The court also notes the legislature’s recent passage of Public Act 03-154, which reaffirms that the meaning of a statute, first, shall be ascertained from the text of the statute and its relationship to other statutes. “If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.” Id.
General Statutes § 52-102b clearly requires that an apportionment complaint filed pursuant to § 52-572h be initiated by service of a writ summons and complaint upon a person not a party to the action (emphasis added), and one needs to look no CT Page 6840 further than the plain language of the statute. Sec. 52-102b(a), (c) and (e) clearly refer to persons who are not a party to an action. “Where statutory language is clearly expressed, as here, courts must apply the legislative enactment according to plain terms . . .” Johnson v. Manson, 196 Conn. 309, 315 (1985).
General Statutes § 52-102b does not permit an apportionment complaint pursuant to § 52-572h to be filed against a present party to an action, by its unambiguous language. Accordingly the motion to strike the apportionment complaint filed by Greg and Kelly Moffat against Deborah A. Vissicchio is hereby granted.
The Court
By: Arnold, J. CT Page 6841