796 A.2d 510
(SC 16600), (SC 16601)Supreme Court of Connecticut
Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.
Argued March 13, 2002
Officially released May 21, 2002
Procedural History
Appeal, in the first case, from the decision by the named defendant granting a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need for the construction of a cellular telecommunications facility by the defendant Cellco Partnership, and appeal, in the second case, from a decision by the defendant denying the plaintiff’s application for a certificate of zoning compliance required to obtain the building permit for that proposed facility, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where the cases were consolidated and tried to the court, Cohn, J.; judgment in the first case for the defendants dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal, and judgment in the second case sustaining the plaintiff’s appeal, from which the plaintiff in the first case and the defendant in the second case appealed. Affirmed.
Ira W. Bloom, with whom was Michael S. Toma, for the appellant in each case (plaintiff town of Westport and defendant zoning board of appeals of the town of Westport).
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Kenneth C. Baldwin, with whom, on the brief, were Bradford S. Babbitt
and Joey Lee Miranda, for the appellee in both cases (Cellco Partnership).
Mark F. Kohler, assistant attorney general, for the appellee in the first case (defendant Connecticut Siting Council).
Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Phillip Rosario and Neil Parille, assistant attorneys general, filed a brief for the office of the attorney general as amicus curiae.
Mary-Michelle U. Hirschoff filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.
Jonathan S. Zorn and Kenneth Ira Spigle, pro hac vice, filed a brief for Sprint Spectrum L.P. as amicus curiae.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
This is a consolidated appeal[1] emanating from a decision of the Connecticut siting council (council), the named defendant in the first case, approving, subject to certain modifications and conditions, an application of the defendant Cellco Partnership (Cellco), doing business as Bell Atlantic Mobile, filed pursuant to the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act; General Statutes § 16-50g et seq.; for a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need for the construction, operation and maintenance of a telecommunications tower facility (tower) to be located in the town of Westport (town). Cellco’s application proposed to share the tower with four other wireless telecommunication
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service providers,[2] including both cellular and noncellular providers. The council approved the application following three public hearings held pursuant to General Statutes § 16-50m,[3] at which the town participated and opposed Cellco’s application. In addition, the
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four other service providers participated as intervenors in the council proceedings.[4]
The council’s decision approving the application was predicated on its determination that it had jurisdiction over the proposed facility because the facility would be “used in a cellular system” within the meaning of General Statutes § 16-50i (a)(6).[5] Indeed, the council asserted that, pursuant to General Statutes § 16-50x (a),[6]
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it had exclusive authority, maintaining that the town does not retain jurisdiction to enforce its own municipal laws, despite the fact that the proposed tower would have both cellular and noncellular attachments. In addressing the merits of whether to issue the certificate, the council found that Cellco’s existing facilities in the area did not provide adequate coverage or capacity in the northern portion of the town and noted similar deficiencies by the other carriers. The council determined that shared access to the tower by the cellular and noncellular service providers would be consistent with state law and policy promoting shared use. With regard to the potential environmental impact of the facility, the council made extensive findings supporting its conclusions that “[d]evelopment of the . . . site would involve minimal land disturbance and would not substantially alter the character of the natural resources including wetlands and watercourse, vegetative composition, and wildlife habitats. Furthermore, there are no environmental constraints at this site [that] would justify denial of this site.” Finally, in response to concerns raised by the town, in order to minimize the impact on the residential neighborhood, the scenic quality of the Merritt Parkway and the Poplar Plains brook that traversed the proposed site, the council ordered that the tower be reduced in height and relocated on the lot further away from the inland wetlands and the watercourse than proposed by Cellco.
Following the council’s approval of the application and grant of the certificate of environmental compatibility and public need, subject to certain conditions, Cellco
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proceeded with plans to construct the approved tower. It submitted the certificate to the town zoning enforcement officer in order to receive the zoning certification necessary to obtain a building permit. The zoning officer informed Cellco that its failure to comply with the town’s zoning regulations prevented the issuance of the permit. Cellco appealed from the zoning enforcement officer’s decision to the zoning board of appeals, which thereafter denied the appeal.
Pursuant to General Statutes §§ 4-183 and 16-50q,[7] the town appealed from the council’s decision approving Cellco’s application for the certificate of environmental compatibility, and pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-8 and 8-10,[8] Cellco appealed from the zoning board of
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appeals’ decision denying its appeal from the zoning officer’s denial of its application for a certificate of zoning compliance. See Westport v Connecticut Siting Council, 47 Conn. Sup. 382, ___ A.2d ___ (2001). Because the claims overlapped, the trial court consolidated the appeals.
The trial court first considered Cellco’s claim that, because the council has exclusive jurisdiction over the siting of a telecommunications tower, pursuant to the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act, and the town had no direct role in the siting process, the town was not aggrieved and, therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the town’s appeal. See Connecticut Business Industry Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals Health Care, 214 Conn. 726, 729, 573 A.2d 736 (1990) (party must be aggrieved to have standing to bring administrative appeal). The trial court rejected that contention, however, concluding that, because, under the town’s theory, a mixed use of cellular and noncellular providers, as in this case, would allow the town to apply its local laws and ordinances, the decision of the council interfering with the town’s rights made it an aggrieved party.
Turning to the merits of the consolidated appeals, the trial court addressed the issue of whether the council improperly asserted its exclusive authority in locating the tower and, concomitantly, whether the zoning board of appeals improperly denied Cellco’s appeal from the denial of its application for a certificate of zoning compliance necessary for the issuance of a building permit. The trial court determined, based upon its reading of §§ 16-50x (a) and 16-50i (a)(6),[9] in conjunction with General Statutes § 16-50p (b)(1)(B) and (b)(2),[10] that
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the legislature intended to give the council exclusive jurisdiction over telecommunication towers, including those that are shared by cellular and noncellular carriers. The trial court next considered the town’s argument that the council’s actions were procedurally and substantively illegal. Applying a limited standard of review pursuant to § 4-183 (j), the court examined whether the council’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether its decision approving the application subject to certain modifications reflected a proper application of the pertinent statutory factors set forth in the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act. Concluding that the council’s actions were proper, the trial court next turned to the town’s procedural claim that the council had acted improperly by deferring any consideration of the town’s zoning regulations until after the council’s approval of the
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application for the certificate of environmental compatibility and public need. Following its examination of the record before the council, which included testimony and exhibits relating to the town’s zoning and other regulatory concerns, the court rejected the town’s procedural claim, concluding that the council had recognized the town’s concerns, including the factors encompassing environmental and residential objections, prior to the application approval, as evidenced, in part, by it conditioning its approval on Cellco’s compliance with some of the town’s recommendations. Accordingly, the trial court, in separate judgments, dismissed the town’s appeal and sustained Cellco’s appeal. This appeal followed.
Our careful examination of the record, coupled with the briefs and arguments of the parties, persuades us that the judgments of the trial court should be affirmed. The question of aggrievement, and the issues pertaining to whether the council’s jurisdiction was exclusive and whether there existed any prejudicial procedural impropriety, were properly resolved in the thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum of decision filed by the trial court. See Westport v. Connecticut Siting Council, supra, 47 Conn. Sup. ___. Because that memorandum of decision fully addresses the arguments raised in the present appeal, it would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion therein contained. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s well reasoned decision. See Walsh v. National Safety Associates, Inc., 241 Conn. 278, 282, 694 A.2d 795 (1997); Molnar v Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 239 Conn. 233, 235, 685 A.2d 1107 (1996); Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. State Board of Labor Relations, 232 Conn. 57, 64, 653 A.2d 151 (1995); Advanced Business Systems, Inc. v. Crystal, 231 Conn. 378, 380-81, 650 A.2d 540
(1994).
The judgments are affirmed.
“(b)(1) The council shall hold a hearing on an application for an amendment of a certificate not less than thirty days nor more than sixty days after receipt of the application in the same manner as a hearing is held on an application for a certificate if, in the opinion of the council, the change to be authorized in the facility would result in any material increase in any environmental impact of such facility or would result in a substantial change in the location of all or a portion of the facility, other than as provided in the alternatives set forth in the original application for the certificate, provided the council may, in its discretion, return without prejudice an application for an amendment of a certificate to the applicant with a statement of the reasons for such return. (2) The council may hold a hearing on a resolution for amendment of a certificate not less than thirty days nor more than sixty days after adoption of the resolution in the same manner as provided in subsection (a) of this section. The council shall hold a hearing if a request for a hearing is received from the certificate holder or from a person entitled to be a party to the proceedings within twenty days after publication of notice of the resolution. Such hearing shall be held not less than thirty days nor more than sixty days after the receipt of such request in the same manner as provided in subsection (a) of this section. (3) The county in which the facility is deemed to be located for purposes of a hearing under this subsection shall be the county in which the portion of the facility proposed for modification is located.
“(c) The council shall cause notices of the date and location of each hearing to be mailed, within one week of the fixing of the date and location, to the applicant and each person entitled under section 16-50l
to receive a copy of the application or resolution. The general notice to the public shall be published in not less than ten point, boldface type.
“(d) Hearings, including general hearings on issues which may be common to more than one application, may be held before a majority of the members of the council.
“(e) During any hearing on an application or resolution held pursuant to this section, the council may take notice of any facts found at a general hearing.”
A minor technical change, which is not relevant to this appeal, was made to § 16-50i (a)(6) in 1999, after the council had rendered its decision in this case. See Public Acts 1999, No. 99-286, § 8. References herein are to the current revision of the statute.
General Statutes § 16-50q provides: “Any party may obtain judicial review of an order issued on an application for a certificate or an amendment of a certificate in accordance with the provisions of section 4-183. Any judicial review sought pursuant to this chapter shall be privileged in respect to assignment for trial in the Superior Court.”
In 1999, a minor technical change, not relevant to this appeal, was made to § 8-8 (b). See Public Acts 1999, No. 99-238. References herein are to the current revision of the statute.
General Statutes § 8-10 provides: “The provisions of sections 8-8
and 8-9 shall apply to appeals from zoning boards of appeals, zoning commissions or other final zoning authority of any municipality whether or not such municipality has adopted the provisions of this chapter and whether or not the charter of such municipality or the special act establishing zoning in such municipality contains a provision giving a right of appeal from zoning boards of appeals or zoning commissions and any provision of any special act, inconsistent with the provisions of said sections, is repealed.”
“(2) When issuing a certificate for a facility described in subdivision (5) or (6) of subsection (a) of section 16-50i, the council may impose such reasonable conditions as it deems necessary to promote immediate and future shared use of such facilities and avoid the unnecessary proliferation of such facilities in the state. The council shall, prior to issuing a certificate, provide notice of the proposed facility to the municipality in which the facility is to be located. Upon motion of the council, written request by a public or private entity which provides telecommunications or community antenna television service to the public or upon written request by an interested party, the council may conduct a preliminary investigation to determine whether the holder of a certificate for such a facility is in compliance with the certificate. Following its investigation, the council may initiate a certificate review proceeding, which shall include a hearing, to determine whether the holder of a certificate for such a facility is in compliance with the certificate. In such proceeding, the council shall render a decision and may issue orders which it deems necessary to compel compliance with the certificate, which orders may include, but not be limited to, revocation of the certificate. Such orders may be enforced in accordance with the provisions of section 16-50u.”
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