2004 Ct. Sup. 4286
No. CV-02-0464908Connecticut Superior Court, Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
March 22, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
DeMAYO, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiff seeks to have the court impose a constructive trust for her benefit over certain funds received by the defendant on the death of one Valenty Gowlash.
The defendant is the niece of the decedent and at the time of his death and in August of 2001 she was the named beneficiary of joint bank accounts totaling about $80,000. She closed out the accounts and took possession of the funds after his death.
The decedent had executed wills in 1990 and 1999, both of which purported to leave half of his estate to the plaintiff and half to the defendant.
The defendant refused to transfer any of the funds in the bank accounts, claiming they were all hers by virtue of the accounts having named her. The plaintiff’s position is that the bank accounts belong in the estate where she would be entitled to a one-half share.
The plaintiff brought this action in six counts but after the plaintiff’s case had concluded, the court permitted the filing of an amended complaint. That complaint, in effect, withdrew the first five counts with only the prayer for imposition of a constructive trust remaining.
DISCUSSION I.
The plaintiff’s argument is that Mr. Gowlash intended to leave all of his money, share and share alike, to the plaintiff and the CT Page 4287 defendant.
There is evidence which contradicts this claim. The accounts had been held by Mr. Gowlash for many years with his brother, the defendant’s father, until his death. They or their predecessor accounts were in existence before the 1999 will was executed.
The defendant’s name appears on an account as far back as 1990.
It is against this factual background that the plaintiff must prove her case by clear and convincing evidence. Cooper v. Cavallaro, 2 Conn. App. 622, 626 (1984).
II.
As in the Cooper v. Cavallaro case, this plaintiff must prove that the bank accounts were not valid inter vivos gifts. (Id.,
626.) This burden would shift to the defendant if the plaintiff, again by clear and convincing evidence, proved a confidential relationship between the defendant and Mr. Gowlash.
In support of her claim as to the relationship, the plaintiff cites the defendant being named by Mr. Gowlash in the trust set out in the 1999 will, she being named in an agreement (Exhibit H) treating with a potential asbestos recovery by Mr. Gowlash, and being named in the wills. Of course, the plaintiff was also named in these documents.
However, the defendant and Mr. Gowlash were not “close,” according to a plaintiff’s witness and he visited her very occasionally. She lived in Burlington, Connecticut, he in the New Haven area.
The plaintiff has shown no inducement by the defendant to create these accounts and it is significant that they existed before the wills were executed and the predecessor beneficiary was the defendant’s father.
The plaintiff and Mr. Gowlash were not related but she and her family were close friends of Mr. Gowlash. They shared a two-family residence at one point.
The defendant points out that one can make out a strong argument that the intent of Mr. Gowlash was to hold these accounts outside his estate. In this regard, he took great pains CT Page 4288 to address what he felt would be a source of money — his asbestos illness claim. This turned out to be worthless, but its concern to Mr. Gowlash suggests he was well informed about assets and inheritances.
The court cannot find there existed a confidential relationship which would free the plaintiff from her burden of proof on this issue.
III.
The Cooper v. Cavallaro case also refers to an alternative route for this plaintiff, viz.:
[O]r that they were assets acquired by the defendant under circumstances which required equity to divest him of his beneficial interest and to convert him into a trustee in order to prevent his unjust enrichment.
Id., 626.
The plaintiff has not shown the defendant was guilty of undue influence or fraud, or that she induced the decedent to create the accounts in question. Allegations on these grounds were originally pleaded but were withdrawn by the amended complaint.
The plaintiff notes that this decedent used the plaintiff’s phone number and his own address on at least one account.
This would certainly tend to eliminate the defendant as having induced the decedent’s actions, but it is not probative of any relevant issue in the case.
In view of the discussion above and applying this test to the facts in this case, the court concludes the plaintiff has not sustained her burden of proof.
CONCLUSION
Judgment may enter for the defendant and the request to impose a constructive trust is denied.
BY THE COURT
Anthony DeMayo, J.T.R. CT Page 4289
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